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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL ! 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ; 
ANONA MAUGHAN, 
Defendant/Respondent, ] 
| Case No. 880035 
> Priority No. 14b 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent submits to the Utah Court of Appeals the 
following brief. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court was invoked 
pursuant to an appeal from a final decision of the First Judicial 
District Court, pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(i) UCA. The Supreme Court 
transferred this matter on March 30, 1988, to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Rule 4A of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Judgment was granted the Respondent in the First Judicial 
District Court at a hearing on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
by both parties. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The sole issue in this case is whether a homeowner 
insurance policy covers a collapse of the subject home, which 
collapse is the result of two concurrent causes, one cause being an 
excluded peril and the other cause being an included peril under 
the provisions of the insurance policy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is a case involving the interpretation of an 
insurance policy. The facts are not in dispute. Both plaintiff 
and defendant filed Motions for Summary Judgment, which were heard 
simultaneously, with judgment being granted in favor of the 
homeowner. (R. 135-36.) 
2. Mrs. Maughan is a homeowner who had resided in a 
single-family dwelling in Wellsville, Utah, since 1935. Her home 
had experienced water seepage in the basement beginning in 1973. 
(R. 70.) To alleviate water seepage into the basement in 1986, 
Mrs. Maughan hired a contractor, who excavated around the exterior 
perimeter of the foundation on June 2, 1986, for the purpose of 
installing a drain. After excavating around three sides of the 
home, the contractor began excavation on the fourth side, when the 
rear foundation wall broke loose of its moorings, the bottom of the 
wall slid into the recently dug trench and the top of the founda-
tion wall fell into the basement of the house. The floor and roof 
structure collapsed, severely compromising the home's structural 
integrity. The house has since been demolished. (R. 70.) 
3. In 1985 Bear River Mutual wrote a homeowner's 
insurance policy (a copy of which policy is included in plaintiff's 
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insurance policy (a copy of which policy is included in plaintiff's 
Brief as Addendum No. 1) on Mrs. Maughan's property. (R. 52.) The 
policy has two applicable provisions. The first such provision 
relates to the collapse of a building: 
This policy insures against direct loss to 
the property covered by the following perils 
as defined and limited herein: 
14. Collapse of buildings or any part thereof 
but excluding loss to outdoor equipmentf awnings, 
fences, pavements, patiosf swimming poolsf under-
ground pipesf flues, drains, cesspools and septic 
tanks, foundations, retaining walls, bulkheads, 
piers, wharves, or docks, all except as the 
direct result of the collapse of a building. 
Collapse does not include settling, cracking, 
bulging or expansion. 
The second applicable provision relates to subsurface water: 
This policy does not insure against loss: 
2. Caused by, resulting from, contributed to 
or aggravated by any earth movement, including 
but not limited to earthquake, volcanic eruption, 
landslide, mudflow, earth sinking, rising or 
shifting; . . . 
3. Caused by, resulting from, contributed to 
or aggravated by any of the following: 
(c) water below the surface of the ground, 
including that which exerts pressure on or 
flows, seeps, or leaks through sidewalks, 
driveways, foundations, walls, basement or 
other opening in such sidewalks, driveways, 
foundations, walls or floors; 
* * * 
4. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company hired a structural 
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engineer by the name of Arnold Coonf to evaluate the building prior 
to demolition. Both Bear River Mutual and Mrs. Maughan regard 
Mr. Coon's evaluation as accurate and both parties are willing to 
rely upon his report, including his description of the factual 
events and conclusions. Mr. Coon sets forth in his Affidavit that: 
9. The soil is a sandy silt which has very 
little stability when wet and unconfined. As 
the excavation as madef the lateral support 
(or confinement) of the soil under the footings 
was destroyed. Any dewatering of the trench 
for installation of the drain pipe would cause 
water to move horizontally into the trench from 
the surrounding soil. The unstable nature of 
the soil would allow some of it to move with 
the water. This combination caused the footings 
and foundation walls to be undermined. With 
lack of support, they failed and slid into the 
trench. There was evidence that the excavated 
soil flowed almost like a chocolate milk shake 
when it was dumped onto the ground along side 
of the trench. A competent contractor should 
have noticed this and been aware of the danger 
he was creating by his actions and should have 
taken measures o prevent such a failure from 
happening. (R. 29, 56.) 
Mr. Coon also states that: 
In my opinion, the failure of the foundation 
walls of the Maughan home was "caused by, re-
sulting from, contributed to or aggravated by" 
water below the surface or ground water, as the 
soil moved from underneath the foundation walls 
into the newly excavated trench, carrying the 
soild from underneath the foundation walls. 
(R. 29.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is Bear River Mutual1s position that the collapse of 
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the home was caused by the subsurface water under the basement 
floor and foundation wall at the time of the collapse; that because 
the subsurface water "contributed to" or "aggravated" the 
situation, the collapse is an excluded peril under paragraphs 2 and 
3 of the policy providing for exclusions. 
It is the homeowner's position that had it not been for 
the excavation by the contractor—a covered peril—the collapse 
would not have occurred, and that even though the subsurface water 
was a contributing factor, the acts of the contractor were the 
"proximate cause" of the collapse. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LOSS? 
In cases in which there is more than one cause, or 
intervening causes, causing a disaster, the authorities and the 
courts use the term "proximate cause" to determine liability. The 
efficient, proximate, or dominate cause which produced the injury 
is the cause which ultimately determines whether the loss is a 
covered or excluded peril under an insurance policy. 
The insurance policy which is the subject of this lawsuit, 
provides for coverage of a collapse of the home (page 2, 1(14) and 
excludes coverage for damage caused by subsurface water (page 3, K2 
& 3c). In this case, there was a collapse in which subsurface 
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water was "a" cause. The legal issue is: What was the "proximate" 
causef if any? 
Plaintiff totally ignored this issue at the trial court, 
and again ignores it in its Brief. Nonetheless, the issue remains: 
Was the excavation by the contractor the proximate cause of the 
collapse, and if so, what is the legal effect? 
II 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OP THE LOSS IS THE ONE WHICH 
DETERMINES WHETHER THE PERIL IS INSURED AGAINST. 
Couch on Insur_aLnce 2d, discusses in considerable detail 
the subject of "proximate cause." (Vol. 18f Pages 1008-1026, 
attached as Appendix A.) While the entire section on "proximate 
cause" in Cojoch is pertinentf the essential paragraphs are: 
1(74:696 Generally 
When loss is sustained by the insured it is necessary that 
the loss be proximately, rather than remotely, caused by 
the peril insured against. 
In order to establish liability within the coverage of an 
insurance policy the loss must result from an act or 
operation covered by the policy, it must be the proximate 
result thereof and unless it is there is no liability. 
The principles of causation should not be so closely 
applied as to defeat the intent of the parties as 
manifested in the contract of insurance. 
Proximate cause must be determined from the factual basis 
presented upon mixed consideration of logicf common sense, 
justice, policy, and precedents. 
1174:706. Causal relation distinguished. 
It is necessary to distinguish between causal relation and 
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the concept of proximate cause. Causal relation requires 
only a cause and effect relationship or sequence whereas 
proximate cause imposes an element of nearness or 
proximateness of the cause to the effect or result. Thusf 
a cause which is remote is not a "proximate cause," even 
though it is in the line of causation. 
1(74:709. Train of events test. 
A cause is proximate when it sets in motion a chain of 
events which result in the loss without the intervention 
of any new or independent force. 
Where the peril specifically insured against sets other 
causes in motion which, in an unbroken sequence and 
connection between the act and the final injury, produce 
the final result for which the insured seeks to recover 
under his policy, the peril insured against will be 
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss, so as 
to render the insurer liable for the entire loss within 
the limits fixed by the policy. 
Proximate cause is that which, in a natural sequence, 
unbroken by any new cause, produces the result which would 
not otherwise have occurred. It is to be noted that this 
statement confuses the concept of causation with that of 
proximateness and in effect would appear to state that as 
long as there is an identifiable chain of cause and effect 
the initiating event is to be deemed the "proximate" cause. 
Illustrative of the train of events situation, it has been 
held that a proximate cause is the cause that naturally 
and probably leads to the result; the cause that in the 
existing conditions would be reasonably expected to 
produce the result; the cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening 
cause produces the result and without which the result 
would not have occurred. 
Similarly it has been held that defining it as "that cause 
which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any 
new cause, produces death, and without which death would 
not have occurred" was not erroneous for failure to 
include the element of "foreseeableness and anticipation 
of an injury or the result of such injury." 
1(74:710 - Foreseeability. 
In some instances, cases have qualified the train of 
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events concept by the requirement, characteristic of tort 
law, of the element of foreseeability, holding that a 
cause is not proximate unless the harm sustained was a 
foreseeable consequence thereof. 
1174:711. Efficient cause. 
In some cases, the concept of proximate cause is defined 
in terms of the efficient cause or the efficient moving 
cause. Thus, it has been said that the proximate cause 
of the happening of a contingency insured against is the 
fundamental, efficient moving cause thereof. Similarly, 
it has been said that proximate cause is the efficient 
cause; the one that necessarily sets the other causes in 
motion. 
A direct and proximate cause is the active and efficient 
cause that sets in motion a train of events which bring 
about a result withcmt_tjte_^ 
starting and working actively and efficiently from a new 
and independent source. 
(Emphasis and underlining supplied.) 
Bear River Mutual's expert, Arnold W. Coon, a structural 
engineer, did an investigation of this disaster and filed a report 
and an Affidavit in this matter. Paragraph 9 of his report, which 
is also included in his Affidavit, supports the proposition that 
the excavation by the contractor was the "proximate cause" of the 
collapse. 
The soil is a sandy silt which has very little stability 
when wet and unconfined. As the excavation was made, the 
lateral support (or confinement) of the soil under the 
footings was destroyed. Any dewatering of the trench for 
installation of the drain pipe would cause water to move 
horizontally into the trench from the surrounding soil. 
The unstable nature of the soil would allow some of it to 
move with the water. This combination caused the footings 
and foundation walls to be undermined. With lack of 
support, they failed and slid into the trench. There was 
evidence that the excavated soil flowed almost like a 
chocolate milk shake when it was dumped onto the ground 
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along side of the trench. A competent contractor should 
have noticed this and been aware of the danger he was 
creating by his actions and should have then taken 
measures to prevent such a failure from happening. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Certainly the subsurface water was a contributing cause of 
the collapse, as stated by Mr. Coonf but he also states that it was 
not the proximate cause: "A competent contractor should have 
noticed this and been aware of the danger he was creating by his 
actions and should have then taken measures to prevent such a 
failure from happening." The subsurface water was a casual or 
remote cause. There was an intervening forcef which set into 
motion the train of events which caused the collapse of the home, 
namely: the excavation performed by the contractor. 
Had no effort been made to excavate around the home the 
home would never had collapsed. Subsurface water had existed 
around the basement of the home since 1973. Only on the day of 
excavation in 1986f did the house collapse. Mrs. Maughan is not 
claiming loss as a result of damage caused by the subsurface water 
or earth movementf but is claiming loss for the collapse of the 
home caused by the excavation. It is not the casual or remote 
cause which determines liability of the insurance company, but the 
efficient, proximate, or dominate cause. 
The case law supports this conclusion. 
In Wygtt v.L-NpjL^ ygA^ g?JL-^ Jr-u_aA Insurance Co. of Seattle, 
304 F.Supp. 781, (attached as Appendix B) homeowners filed suit 
-9-
against their insurance company, which had issued a policy on their 
home, for damage suffered to their home as a result of certain 
third-parties doing excavating work on contiguous property, causing 
the removal of the lateral support to the foundation wall. The 
insurance company defended on the basis that the policy excluded 
losses "caused by, resulting from, contributing to or aggravated by 
any earth movement. . ." (at 782)—which language as is identical 
to the language in the present policy. There was no question in 
Wy^tt that there was "earth movement." But the Court said "it 
would appear that the distinction should be drawn between an 
excluded event which is a cause and such an event which is the 
inevitable result of another event." (At 783.) 
The Wyatt Court overturned the insurance company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and remanded the case to the lower court for trial 
stating that it was now a question of fact for the jury to 
determine whether the movement of earth was a result of actions 
caused by third parties. The court gave the lower court the 
directive that: 
If in fact at the trial it is established that actions of 
the third or fourth-party defendants or others caused such 
(earth movement) then the policy will be held by the court 
to cover plaintiff's provable damage and the exclusionary 
clause held not applicable. (At 784.) 
In S£bel^ a_y^ J?isl_e_r, 377 P.2d 889, (attached as Appendix C) 
the California Supreme Court was faced with a fact situation in 
which the homeowner's home, which had been built on a compacted 
land fill, settled "to uneven elevations" as a result of a leak in 
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the sewer outflow from the house, which infiltrated the unstable 
earth near and below the foundation. (At 892.) The Court found 
that the cause of the sewer pipe breaking and leaking was either 
the result of settling and consolidation of the inadequately 
compacted fill material upon which the pipe was placed or the 
improper closure of certain joints in the pipe, or "a combination 
of both these causes." (At 892.) Claim was made by the Plaintiff 
against both the builder and Plaintiff's insurance company which 
had issued a policy of insurance on the home. The insurance 
company defended on the basis that the policy did not insure 
against loss from "settling, cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of 
pavements, foundations, walls, floors or ceiling; unless loss by 
. . . collapse of building insues." 
Plaintiff took the position that the insurance policy 
covered the loss because the damage was the result of a rupture of 
the sewer line attributable to the negligence of a third-party, 
rather than settling. The Court agreed, finding that the acts of 
third-parties were the efficient proximate cause of the loss. The 
Court quoted ^ch_o_n Insurance* and stated: 
*"[Iln determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, 
where there is a concurrence of different causes, the efficient 
cause—the one that sets others in motion—is the cause to which 
the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it 
and operate more immediately in producing the disaster." (See 6 
Couch, Insurance (1930), §1463 P.5298.) 
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The virtual absence of subsidence damage in the prior 
four years in the existence of the house here in question 
clearly indicates that the broken pipe was the predomin-
ating or moving efficient cause of the loss. (At 895.) 
The Court also analyzed the case from the perspective of "but for" 
the acts of third-parties, finding that the settling of the house 
would not have occurred "but for" the leak in the sewer pipe; i.e.f 
acts of third-parties. Hencef the loss was covered by the insurance 
policy. 
The insurance company attempted to defend on the basis 
that damage would not have occurred "but for" the settling of the 
underlying earth. The court denied this argument on the basis that 
the sewer leak was the peril "proximately" causing the loss, which 
was immediate in time of the occurrence of the damage. 
In discussing the concept of "proximate causation" in 
Sabella the California Supreme Court cited other cases involving 
insurance policies in which proximate causation was an issue. Six 
cases were citedf but the example from only one is necessary here 
to prove the point. The case involved an insuredf suffering from 
incurable cancerf an excluded perilf who died in a fire. The 
holding of the case was that the insurance company was liable to 
honor the terms of its policy covering the insured on the basis 
that the fire set in progress the chain of events leading directly 
to the death, which was the prime or moving cause of deathf even 
though the insured was likely to die of cancer in the near future 
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anyway. See BrjK>ks_v^ Metjrj^ poljJ^ an^ ^ 27 Cal. 2d 305, 
163 P.2d 689. Cited in Sabellja at 896. 
In Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W.2d 287, (attached as 
Appendix D) a homeowner hired a contractor to build a home on a 
large unstable land mass. A subsequent owner took possession of 
the home which thereafter experienced damage as a result of earth 
movement under the home rendering it uninhabitable. The homeowner 
filed claim with his insurance company, which defended the action 
on the basis that there had not been a complete collapse and that 
the insurance policy excluded damage caused by "earthquake, 
landslide or other earth movement." To determine whether the 
exclusionary provisions of the insurance policy applied, this Court 
also addressed the "proximate cause" issue and the "but for" 
argument. 
All of the experts agreed that earth movement caused the 
damage to the house, but there was also expert testimony 
that the foundation to the house was inadequate and that 
had the foundation been adequately constructed, the 
collapse would not have occurred. 
It is our opinion that the exclusions contained in the 
policy apply only when it can be shown that earth movement 
et cetera was the sole cause of the damage. If it can be 
shown that the building was improperly constructed (taking 
into consideration the type of soil, the geography of the 
area et cetera) and "but for" the inadequate construction 
the building would not have collapsed even with the earth 
movement, then the damage should come under the protection 
of the policy. One of the primary purposes of a policy 
such as this is to protect against faulty workmanship or 
planning. (At 295.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Applying the law of Wya_tt, SabelJLa. and Vormeljcejc to the 
present casef the pertinent questions are: Why did the soil move 
from underneath the foundation walls? Was it because of "the newly 
excavated trench"? What caused the newly excavated trench to 
exist? 
Plaintiff's expert provides the answers. According to Mr. 
Coon " . . . the soil moved from underneath the foundation walls 
into the newly excavated trench, carrying the soil from underneath 
the foundation walls." (Aff. p. 2.) "As the excavation was made, 
the lateral support (or confinement) of the soil under the footings 
was destroyed. * * * A competent contractor should have noticed 
this and been aware of the danger he was creating by his actions 
and should have taken measures to prevent such a failure from 
happening." (Report 1(9
 f Aff. p. 2.) (R. 29, 56.) 
Had it not been for the excavation by the contractor the 
house would not have collapsed. 
Ill 
COLLAPSE WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED 
"BUT FOR" EXCAVATION BY CONTRACTOR 
The Courts in SabelJLa and VojnnelJke_r raise the "but for" 
argument as one step in determining proximate causation. Cojich^ o^n 
^nsuranee 2d, also relies upon the "but for" cause: 
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§74:713. "But for" cause. 
In defining proximate cause, it has been held that the 
peril insured against must be the sole proximate cause of 
that loss, so causing and so connected with the loss that 
it could not otherwise have been produced. 
Defendant had experienced serious water problems in the 
basement since 1973. The fact that the house had not experienced 
any settling in the prior 14 years and that it collapsed 
simultaneous with the excavation, certainly leads to the conclusion 
that "but for" the excavation by the contractor the house would not 
have collapsed. It was the acts of the contractor which were the 
predominating or moving efficient cause of the loss—not subsurface 
water. 
IV 
PLAINTIFFS CASES DO NOT PARALLEL THE 
PRESENT FACT SITUATION 
Appellant's Brief relies on the theory espoused in Stewart 
¥^ _JLL§f^ JL:rf:^ _^  477 P.2d 966 and Krug_j^L 
MiilejAL Mu t ua 1 Insurance As so c i_a t i on of 111 i no is, 495 P.2d 949. 
In ^tewart a home was built on a mine shaft and it sank. 
The court determined the exclusion for earth movement was 
applicable. Defendant herein has no quarrel with the law of this 
casef but the fact situation does not contain an intervening cause 
which was the proximate cause of the disaster. The case is not 
even applicable. 
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In Kni£ the homeowner attempted to recover damages to 
his home resulting from a "collapse" within the terms of the 
policy. In fact/ the east wall of Plaintiff's kitchen had 
"separated from the ceiling" (at 951) as a result of settling due 
to a plumbing leak. The house was not rendered structurally 
unsound or uninhabitable and thus the court found it had "settled," 
rather than "collapsed." (The court relied upon language in Sabella 
v^ Jtfj_ser, previously cited herein, regarding settling; but the 
court in SabeJJja found the settling to be so extensive as to render 
the home uninhabitable and therefore collapsed.) 
V 
PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLINING 
CONTRACTS FOR INSURANCE 
In the Wyatt casef supra, the court dealt with the issue 
of the rationale behind exclusionary clauses in insurance policies, 
which issue the Plaintiff raised with the court. 
Plaintiffs assert that the reason for the insertion of the 
exclusionary clause above quoted in all risk insurance 
policies is to relieve the insurer from occasional major 
disasters which are almost impossible to predict and thus 
to insure against. There are earthquakes or floods which 
cause a major catastrophe and wreak damage to everyone in 
a large area rather than one individual policyholder. When 
such happens, the very basis upon which insurance companies 
operate is said to be destroyed. When damage is so wide-
spread no longer can insurance companies spread the risk 
and offset a few or the the average percentage of losses 
by many premiums. Looking at the special exclusionary 
clause in the policy here in question, it seems to cover 
situations where one single event could adversely affect 
a large number of policyholders. Besides the particular 
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clause which is before this court the insurer also 
excludes floodsf tidal wavesr a back up of water below the 
surface, changes in temperature and changes in the law. 
All of these are phenomena likely to affect great numbers 
of people when they occur. 
This gives some force to the view that the various 
exclusions were not intended to cover the situation as 
here where "earth movement" occurred under a single 
dwelling, allegedly due to human action of third persons 
in the immediate vicinity of the damage. It seems hard to 
contend that the insurance policy meant to exclude all 
earth movements, for it is difficult to distinguish 
between a situation where a piece of heavy equipment 
breaks loose and hits a house causing serious damage and a 
situation where that equipment instead hits only an 
embankment next to a house but causes the earth to move 
and thereby damages the house. Certainly not all earth 
movements, or at least those where some human action 
causes such are included in the exclusion. If this 
interpretation creates an ambiguity in the language then 
it is necessary to decide what earth movements were 
intended to be covered. The class cited in the 
exclusionary clause is therefore held, if not limited to 
natural phenomena, at least not to exclude coverage in the 
case at bar. 
There is no dispute in Wyatjt that the policy covered acts 
of third-parties. The present case also involves a similar fact 
situation in which a third party, excavating around a home—a 
single rather than a widespread event—caused the collapse of 
Defendant's home. 
VI 
AMBIGUITY TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OP COVERAGE 
If there be any ambiguity in the subject insurance policy 
by virtue of there being a provision insuring against collapse and 
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a provision excluding coverage for damage occasioned by subsurface, 
the ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the insured. 
Since a policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities are 
construed against the insurer. DtaJ^ajjnJtar^ 
S_Sonsr 665 P.2d 1308 (1983). (Other citations omitted.) 
CONCLUSION 
The subsurface water problems experienced by Defendant set 
in motion the "train of events" which ultimately led to the 
collapse of Mrs. Maughan's home. But there was an intervening 
force and one which was controllable by human actions. That event 
was the contractor's excavation around three sides of the home. 
It is clear that the home had experienced subsurface water 
problems for 14 years and had not collapsed during that time. Only 
on June 2, 1986, after the contractor removed the earth around the 
foundation walls did the foundation walls collapse. "But for" the 
acts of the contractor, the house would be standing today. 
It is the train of events set in motion by the contractor 
which caused the collapse of the home, not the train of events set 
in motion by the subsurface water. Prior to the excavation, there 
is no evidence that there was any earth movement because of the 
subsurface water leading to a potential collapse. 
-18-
Couch on JCnsurance^dr and the cases cited hereinf all 
rely upon the issue of "proximate causation" and treat earth 
movement and subsurface water as a casual relation in like cases. 
In this particular case, the proximate causation of the collapse of 
the home was the excavation by the contractor, not earth movement. 
Plaintiff, in its Memorandum for Summary Judgementf 
completely ignores the issue of "proximate cause" of the 
contractor. It is a factor which can not be ignored. Had it not 
been for the contractor, the house would not have collapsed. As a 
result, the peril which caused the damage was insured against. 
The judgment of the Trial Court should be upheld. 
DATED this _((__ day of May, 1988. 
/-JiLi 
TjBgmLD S. JEN 
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§ 74:695 CX)UCH ON INSURANCE 2d 
J 74:695. Sprinkler damage insurance. 
Under a policy insuring against damage from accidental discharge of 
in automatic sprinkler, negligence of the insured, his agent, servant, or 
Dthers, not amounting to fraud, though the direct cause of an accident 
md loss, is covered by, and does not defeat, a policy of insurance.19 
i* A provision in a policy against accidental discharge of an automatic 
sprinkler, that it does not cover loss or damage caused by the neglect 
of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the 
property insured, refers to the means to be used, after the occurrence 
of the accident causing the loss, to prevent greater loss than is 
aecessa y, and not to any act of negligence causing the accident and 
loss." 
B. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
5 74:696. Generally. 
\t When loss is sustained by the insured it is necessary that the loss be 
proximately, rather than remotely, caused by the peril insured against.1 
iTnmp. Co. (1886) 117 US 312, 29 L 
frEd 873, 6 SCt 750, 1176. 
19. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v 
: United States Casualty Co. (1903) 172 
Mo 135, 72 SW 635. 
KO. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v 
United States Casualty Co., supra. 
L Smith v Universal Ins. Co. (1821) 19 
, US 176, 185, 5 L Ed 235, 237; Waters 
v Merchants Louisville Ins. Co. (1837) 
36 US 213, 9 L Ed 691; General Mut. 
Ins. Co. v Sherwood (1853) 55 US 351, 
366, 19 L Ed 452, 458; Insurance Co. v 
•* Boon (1877) 95 US 117, 24 L Ed 395; 
r Mulkr v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. 
iCo. (CA) 246 F 759; Princess Garment 
I Co. v Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1940, |CA6 Ohio) 115 F2d 380. See, Fidelity 
I & Casualty Co. v Griner (1930, CA9 
jL Cal) 44 F2d 706; Commercial Casualty 
v Ins. Co. v Stinson (1940, CA6 Mich) 
U 1 1 F 2 63, ce* -u 311 US 667, 85 L 
Ed 42c, 61 S Ct 25; Mandles v Guard-
ian Life Ins. Co. (1940, CA10 Colo) 
I 115 F2d 994; Winsor v Massachusetts 
I Mot Life Ins. Co. (1941) 30 Ala App 
64, 200 So 641. See, National Life & 
Acci. Ins. Co. v McGhee (1939) 238 
Ala 471, 191 So 884; Fogarty v Fidelity 
& Casualty Co. (1937) 122 Conn 245, 
188 A 481; Szymanska v Equitable Life 
Ins. Co. (1936) 37 Dei 272, 183 A 309; 
Case v Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1852) 13 
111 676; Carter v Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
(1940) 217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75; Ko-
komo Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v Wolford 
(1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167 NE 156, 
Slaughter v Columbus Mut. Life Ins 
Co. (1932) 214 Iowa 451, 240 NW 229; 
Beckley v New York Life Ins. Co. 
(1940) 229 Iowa 1007, 295 NW 844; 
National Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Cox 
(1917) 174 Ky 683, 192 SW 636; 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. v Robison 
(1939) 278 Ky 678, 129 SW2d 192; 
McCargo v New Orleans Ins. Co. 
(1845, La) 10 Rob 202; Caballeno & 
Basualdo v Home Mut. Ins. Co. (1860) 
15 La Ann 217; Bouchard v Prudential 
Ins. Co. (1937) 135 Me 238, 194 A 
405; Freeman v Mercantile Mut. Ace. 
Ass'n (1892) 156 Mass 351, 30 NE 
1013; Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v Meri-
den Fire Ins. Co. (1893) 158 Mass 570, 
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In order to establish liability within the coverage of an insurance 
policy the loss must result from an act or operation covered by the 
policy, it must be the proximate result thereof and unless it is there is 
no liability.2 
The principles of causation should not be so closely applied as to 
defeat the intent of the parties as manifested in the contract of 
insurance.8 
Proximate cause must be determined from the factual basis presented 
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and 
precedents.4 
§ 74:697. Policy provision. 
Whether a policy speaks of proximate cause or equivalent terms, loss 
is significant when resulting from a specified peril only if the loss is the 
proximate result of the operation of the peril. This is true whether the 
33 NE 690; Jiannetti v National Fire 
Ins. Co. (1931) 277 Mass 434, 178 NE 
640; Wrobcl v General Acci. Fire & 
Life Assur. Corp (1934) 288 Mass 206, 
192 NE 498, Russell v German F. Ins. 
Co (1907) 100 Minn 528. I l l NW 400 
(ovrld Strobel v Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
Co, 255 Minn 201, 96 NW2d 195); 
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v St. Paul Mer-
cury Indem. Co. (1954) 242 Minn 91, 
64 NW2d 380 (ovrld on other grounds 
Woodnch Constr. Co, v Indemnity 
Ins. Co 252 Minn 86, 89 NW2d 412); 
Delametter v Home Ins. Co. (1938) 233 
Mo App 645, 126 SW2d 262; Rieger v 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1937) 234 Mo 
App 93, 110 SW2d 878. See, Schepman 
v Mutual Ben Health & Acci. Ass'n 
231 Mo App 651, 104 SW2d 777; 
Runyon v Monarch Ace. Ins Co. 
(1932) 108 NJL 489, 158 A 530; 
Cramer v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co (1940) 18 NJ Misc 367, 13 A2d 
651; City F. Ins. Co. v Corlies (NY) 21 
Wend 367; Patrick v Commercial Ins. 
Co (NY) 11 Johns 14; Gates v Madi-
son County Mut. Ins. Co. (1851) 5 NY 
469; Babcock v Montgomery County 
Mut. Ins. Co. (NY) 6 Barb 637, affd 4 
NY 326; German Fire Ins. Co. v Roost 
(1897) 55 Ohio St 581, 45 NE 1097; 
Kenney v Occidental Ins. Co. (1940) 66 
Ohio App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32 
Ohio L Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237; Federal 
Life Ins. Co. v Firestone (1932) 159 
Okla 228, 15 P2d 141; Hillier v Alle-
gheny County Mut. Ins. Co. (1846) 3 
Pa 470; Goldenberg v Equitable life 
Assur. Soc (1934) 113 Pa Super 414, 
173 A 445; Tannenbaum v Connecticut 
Fire Ins. Co. (1937) 127 Pa Super 278, 
193 A 305. See, Neely v Provident Life 
& Acci. Ins. Co. (1936) 322 Pi 417, 
185 A 784; Troupe v Benefit Asso. of 
Railway Employees (1930) 57 SD 147, 
231 NW 529; McBurgess v Federal 
Life Ins. Co. (1927) 5 Tenn App 284; 
Federal Life Ins. Co. v Raley (1937) 
130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d 972; Lavender 
v Continental Life Ins. Co. (1927) 143 
Wash 201, 253 P 595; Hanley v Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co. (1931) 164 Wash 
320, 2 P2d 636. 
2. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v Gil-
more, Gardner & Kirk Oil Co. (1946, 
CA10 Okla) 157 F2d 929. 
3. Fogarty v Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
(1935) 120 Conn 296, 180 A 458; Haik 
v United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. (1931) 15 La App 97, 130 So 118. 
4. Szymanska v Equitable Life Ins. Co. 
(1936) 37 Del 272, 183 A 309; Mer-
chants Co. v Hartford Acci. & Indem. 
Co. (1939) 187 Miss 301, 188 So 571, 
sugg of error overr 187 Miss 309, 192 
So 566. 
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J. * r 
effect of holding that there is a proximate relationship is to bring the 
loss within the coverage of the policy or to exclude it from coverage by 
making an exception applicable. 
h The words, "consequences resulting therefrom," used in an insurance 
against loss*- from the "derangement or breaking of the engine or 
mawhinery,M mean an immediate or proximate, but not a remote, 
consequence.* 
* I 
§ 74:698! Statutory regulation. 
In some jurisdictions, the subject of proximate cause and remote 
cause in connection with liability on contracts of insurance is regulated 
by express statutory provision, such as that "an insurer is liable for a 
loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although 
a peril not contemplated -by the contract may have been the remote 
cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril 
insured against was only a remote cause. "• 
i • tt 
§ 74:699, Burden of proof. 
^ In an action to recover on a double indemnity provision of a life 
^policy, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by preponderance of 
the evidence that the accidental injury was the proximate cause of 
insured's death.7 
I To recover under a double indemnity clause of the life policy 
Wering death resulting from bodily injury effected solely through 
fexternal, violent, and accidental means, the plaintiff has the burden of 
iproof to show that insured died as the direct and proximate result of 
lexternal, violent, and accidental means.8 
f § 74:700, Questions of law or fact. 
I* The question of proximate cause is generally held to be one for the 
* trier of facts.* 
i 5. Orient Ins "o. v Adams (1887) 123 217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75. 
g, i 67, 31 L Ed 63, 8 S Ct 68.
 g W i n s o r v Massachusetts Mut Life Ins 
$. Board" of Ed. v Alliance Assur. Co Co. (1941) 30 Ala App 64, 200 So 641. 
I P t i S F S*?*1 r / v willed na908" 9. Muller v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins 
1
 ^r^.aW?^K ffi Co- < 1 9 1 7 ' CA2 N Y > 246 F 759; Fairc* 
« I % V ? VA&fin *Ct 690 Pacmc l o u*n v F , d e , i ty & <***%<*. Q9U) 
581, 53 L Ed 660, 29 SCI 690^ Pacific
 5 4 °. DC 2 8 6 297 F 681; Princess 
Heating A Ventilatmg 0 , . v W t a u j
 G j ^ t ^ v ' F i r c m a n > s F u n d I n i . 
S^8£«C ,f?t£ i rf lm' ( } Co. (1940, CA6 Ohio) 115 F2d 380; 
Cal 367, 111 P 4. Western Assur. Co. v Hann (1917) 201 
7. Carter v Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1940) Ala 376, 78 So 232; National Life & 
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Acci. Ins. Co. v McGhee (1939) 238 
Ala 471, 191 So 884; Winsor v Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins Co. (1941) 30 
Ala App 64, 200 So 641; Prudential 
Ins. Co v Crolcy (1940) 199 Ark 630, 
135 SW2d 322; Hall v General Acci. 
Assur Corp (1915) 16 Ga App 66, 85 
SE 600, Phcnix Ins. Co. v Jones (1915) 
16 Ga App 261, 85 SE 206; Pacific 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Meldrim (1919) 24 
Ga App 487, 101 SE 305; Rowden v 
Travelers Protective Asso. (1916) 201 
111 App 295; Rebenstorf v Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. (1939) 299 HI App 71, 19 
NE2d 420, Carter v Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. (1940) 217 Ind 282, 27 NE2d 75; 
Foster v North American Acci. Ins. 
Co. (1916) 176 Iowa 399, 158 NW 401; 
Carpenter v Security Fire Ins. Co. 
(1918) 183 Iowa 1226, 168 NW 231; 
Tracy v Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. (1928) 
207 Iowa 1042, 222 NW 447 (fire in 
automobile as proximate cause of dam-
ages caused by running it into ditch in 
effort to put out fire); Beckley v New 
York Life Ins. Co. (1940) 229 Iowa 
1007, 295 NW 844; Williams v General 
Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. (1936) 
144 Kan 755, 62 P2d 856; Guardian 
Life Ins Co. v Robison (1939) 278 Ky 
678, 129 SW2d 192; Todd v Traders' & 
Mechanics' Ins Co. (1918) 230 Mass 
595, 120 NE 142, Kangas v New York 
Life Ins Co. (1923) 223 Mich 238, 193 
NW 867, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v 
Wilhams (1938) 180 Miss 894, 178 So 
477; Beckerleg v Locomotive Engi-
neers' Mut. Life & Acci. Ins. Ass'n 
(1925, Mo App) 274 SW 917; Smith v 
Washington Nat Ins. Co. (Mo App) 91 
SW2d 169, Schepman v Mutual Ben. 
Health & Acci Ass'n (1937) 231 Mo 
App 651, 104 SW2d 777; Delametter v 
Home Ins. Co. (1938) 233 Mo App 
645, 126 SW2d 262, Eagan v Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. (1939) 234 Mo App 295, 
128 SW2d 1085; United Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. (1934) 
242 App Div 420, 275 NYS 47, affd 
267 NY 576, 196 NE 587; Kenney v 
Occidental Ins Co (1940) 66 Ohio 
App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32 Ohio L 
Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237; Jones v Com-
monwealth Casualty Co. (1917) 255 Pa 
566, 100 A 450, Kelley v Piwsourgn 
Casualty Co. (1917) 256 Pa 1, 100 A 
494, Kelly v Prudential Ins. Co. (1939) 
334 Pa 143, 6 A2d 55; Johnson v 
Kentucky Cent. Life A Acci. Ins. Co. 
(1941) 144 Pa Super 116, 18 A2d 507; 
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v Ed-
wards (1919, Tex Civ App) 210 SW 
856 wnt dism woj; North American 
Ace. Ass'n v Adams (1930, Tex Civ 
App) 32 SW2d 525; Washington Fidel-
ity Nat. Ins. Co. v Williams (1930, Tex 
Civ App) 33 SW2d 796 (death
 # as 
caused by exposure or by injury re-
ceived while repairing automobile tire), 
revd on other grounds (Tex Com App) 
49 SW2d 1093; McVeigh v Interna-
tional Travelers Assur. Co. (1936, Tex 
Civ App) 101 SW2d 644, writ dism 
woj, Browning v Equitable Life Assur. 
(1938) 94 Utah 570, 80 P2d 348; Ku-
bey v Travelers' Protective Ass'n 
(1920) 109 Wash 453, 187 P 335; Kear-
ney v Washington Nat. Ins. Co. (1935) 
184 Wash 579, 52 P2d 903; Kane v 
Order of United Commercial Travelers 
(1940) 3 Wash 2d 355, 100 P2d 1036; 
Pierce v Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
(1941) 7 Wash 2d 151, 109 P2d 322; 
Egan v Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 224 
Wis 596, 273 NW 68.
 : »$&. 
* Where insured, seeking recovery un-
der a windstorm policy, adduced evi-
dence of damage and relied upon a 
hypothesis developed from weather 
data and other circumstances to show 
that wind damaged the property during 
a storm, and insurer by an expert wit* 
ness and other evidence attempted "to 
demonstrate that building collapsed 
from weight of snow on the roof, ques-
tion of causation was one for the jury, 
and verdict for the insurer would not 
be disturbed Sussex Poultry Co.$v 
American Ins. Co. (1973, Del Sup) 301 
A2d 281. r f r 
In action on policy covering death 
caused directly, exclusively and inde-
pendently of all other causes, from 
external, violent and purely accidental 
means, question of proximate cause of 
the insured's death after he was in-
volved in an automobile accident was 
for the jury. Lincoln American Life 
nt 
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| Where the breach of a condition must have caused the loss in order 
to avail the insurer, the question is for the jury if the evidence leaves it 
in doubt," j 
I Where,there is competent evidence on the question of proximate 
cause from which reasonable men might draw different conclusions, the 
question is one for the jury to determine." 
Peril of the sea is not the proximate cause as a matter of law of 
damage to a cargo of rice within the meaning of a marine policy, 
where the jury found that the damage was proximately caused by a 
closing of the ventilators and hatches and where the weather encoun-
tered was normal and to be anticipated and no weather rendered it 
necessary to close the ventilators for the safety of the ship, and the 
ventilators were not closed for a longer period than would be in 
contemplation of the parties.11 
§ 74:701. --Concurrent causes. 
Where more than one cause contributes to an injury, and if there is 
doubt, or if prudent persons could draw different conclusions, the 
question as to which of the contributing causes is the efficient, proxi-
mate, dominant cause is one for the jury.w 
| Where the question is whether the insured building was destroyed by 
fire, or by an explosion of dynamite which occurred a few minutes 
prior to the fire, and the evidence is conflicting, a finding of the jury 
• - * • • * • 
In* Co.!v Ruscoe (1968, Miss) 210 So 
2d 769.1 
rfheie question presented to the jury 
is whether the loss was due to wind-
storm within coverage or to water 
within exclusion, the entire question of 
proximate cause is treated as one of 
fact independent of the explicit applica-
tion of any rule of law. Grace v Lititz 
Mut Ins. Co. (1972, Miss) 257 So 2d 
217. 
Generally, it is for the trier of fact to 
determine the dominant and efficient 
cause of a loss. Nassif Realty Corp. v 
National Fire Ins. Co. (1968) 109 NH 
117, 244 A2d 194, citing Couch 2d. 
10. Township Board of Hillman v Empire 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1931) 253 Mich 
394, 235 NW 194, applying Mich Pub 
Acts 1921, No. 264 (and holding ques-
tion of sufficiency of violation by use of 
<10I2 
motion-picture machine in a public 
hall, to be for jury). 
11. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v 
Sutfin (1945) 196 Okla 567, 166 P2d 
434. 
12. Canada Rice Mills v Union Marine & 
General Ins. Co. (1939, Canada) 53 
Brit Col 440, 2 DLR 306 (CA) (where 
the ventilators and hatches were fre-
quently closed because of rain and fog 
normal and foreseeable for that time of 
year). 
13. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v Whipking 
(1930) 96 Ind App 167, 170 NE 548. 
Which of two concurring causes was 
the proximate cause of loss under a 
windstorm policy is a question of fact. 
Nassif Realty Corp. v National Fire 
Ins. Co. (1968) 109 NH 117, 244 A2d 
194, citing Couch 2d. 
ACTIONS AND REMEDIES § 74:70! 
that fire was the proximate cause of the destruction will notfh 
disturbed.14 | | g 
The question whether a bridge insured against cyclones, ete.f t»u 
excluding injuries by floods, was damaged as the proximate result Jo 
floodwaters, or by heavy boats being driven against it by a cyclone 
windstorm, or tornado, was held to be one of fact for the jury.1* MM 
Whether a windstorm was the efficient and proximate cauJelS 
damage to a building within the coverage of an insurance policy o: 
whether a blizzard or a snowstorm was the efficient and proximati 
cause within the meaning of an exclusionary clause in the policy, is i 
question for the jury to determine." ;|? ] 
Whether the insured under a collision policy failed to protect th< 
automobile after loss when the oil pan struck a pipe projecting fron 
the street surface, so as to preclude recovery for loss of the engine bj 
lack of oil, was for the jury under evidence that after the collision th< 
insured got out and looked under the automobile but assumed the pip< 
had struck the exhaust pipe and did not note whether it had struct 
and damaged the oil pan, and thereupon drove on until the motoi 
knocked and burned out, the issue being whether he was negligent in 
failing to ascertain the actual damage by thorough inspection!and 
whether such negligence, if any, was an intervening and proximate 
cause.17 
§ 74:702. —Injury or disease. 
It is a question for the jury where there is an issue of fact uporr the 
point of whether the proximate cause of insured's death waaWan 
accidental injury or a disease from which he was suffering, and the 
evidence is of such character that equally prudent persons might draw 
different conclusions concerning which of the contributing causes was 
the efficient, dominant, and proximate cause.1* J^K: 
14. Phenix Ins. Co. v Jones (1915) 16 Ga Prudential Ins. Co. v Croley (1940) 199 
App 261, 85 SE 206. Ark 630, 135 SW2d 322; Rinaldi v 
15. Phenix Ins. Co. v Charleston Bridge %f « ' " ^ < £ <l93*> " • ? • • 
Co. (1895, CA4 SC) 65 F 628. I 1 9 ' 1 7£ A ^ i ^ / n 0 ? ^ ^ 
Assur. Corp. (1915) 16 Ga App 66, 85 
16. Anderson v Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. SE 600; Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co. 
(1950) 231 Minn 469, 43 NW2d 807. v Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167 
17. Geist v Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (1953) ? L i t L l ^ & i t ^ r W W l , f TTA 173 PaSuner 587 98 A2H 221 Continental Casualty Co. v Uoyd 1 /J r a bupcr ;>»7, 98 A2d 223.
 (m5) J 6 5 U d ^ ? 3 N £ g 2 4 . ^ J . 
18. Clay County Cotton Co. v Home Life dent Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Diehlman 
Ins. Co. (1940, CA8 Ark) 113 F2d 856; (1935) 259 Ky 320, 82 SW2d 350; 
Winsor v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v Robison 
Co. (1941) 30 Ala App 64, 200 So 641; (1939) 278 Ky 678, 129 SW2d 192; 
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Spit is a "question of fact for the jury whether the peritonitis from 
Itohich.the insured died was directly and proximately caused by an 
I accidental injury which he suffered, or whether it was due to an 
I intervening operation." 
KJ|Whether^ blow to the chest, received by the insured when he fell 
I due to the breaking of a stool upon which he was sitting, was directly, 
I exclusively, and independently of all other causes the cause of his death 
1 through accidental means, where at the time he was suffering from 
t arteriosclerosis, which was merely compatible with his age and was in a 
gpassive condition at the time of the injury, was a question for the jury 
f to determine.10 P&The question whether a fall causing death was due to accidental 
means independent of any other cause or was due to or contributed to 
I by a disease of the heart is for determination by the jury where no one 
I saw the deceased fall and no one could tell except by inference what 
Ecaused him to fall.1 
p f | Where expert testimony is conflicting, the question whether death 
Irfrorn cerebral hemorrhage resulted from ptomaine poisoning or from 
{Pother sickness is for the jury.1 
| p | T h e question whether loss of vision of an eye was due to a retinal 
•"hemorrhage of the inside rear portion of the eye and could not have 
f been caused by the impact of a grain of sand with the cornea in front 
W of the eye, raises an issue for the jury to determine.8 
S Skinner v Commercial Travelers' Mut. 
* Acci Asa'n (1916) 190 Mich 353, 157 
NW 105; Abbott v Travelers Ins. Co. 
:(1920) 208 Mich 654, 176 NW 473; 
[Hickey v Ministers' Casualty Union 
(1916) 133 Mian 215, 158 NW 45; 
Frommelt v Travelers Ins. Co. (1921) 
1150 Mian 66, 184 NW 565; Wheeler v 
.Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1923) 298 Mo 
[619, 251 SW 924; Moon v Order of 
United Commercial Travelers (1914) 96 
[Neb 65, 146 NW 1037; Western Indem 
Co. v MacKechnic (1916, Tex Civ 
rApp) 185 SW 615, later app (Tex Civ 
App) 214 SW 456; North American 
>Acci. Ins. Co. v Miller (1917, Tex Civ 
^App) 193 SW 750 writ ref; National 
& Acci. Ins. Co. v Weaver (1920, ! » 
r Tex Civ App) 226 SW 754; Browning v 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1938) 94 
Utah 570, 80 P2d 348; Rorabaugh v 
Great Eastern Casualty Co. (1921) 117 
Wash 7, 200 P 587; Kearney v Wash-
ington Nat. Ins. Co. (1935) 184 Wash 
1014 
579, 52 P2d 903; Kane v Order of 
United Commercial Travelers (1940) 3 
Wash 2d 355, 100 P2d 1036, Pierce v 
Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co (1941) 7 
Wash 2d 151, 109 P2d 322, Egan v 
Travelers Ins. Co. (1937) 224 Wis 596, 
273 NW 68; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 
v Gratiot (1933) 45 Wyo 1, 14 P2d 
438. 
19. Jones v Commonwealth Casualty Co. 
(1917) 255 Pa 566, 100 A 450 
20. Foulkrod v Standard Ace Ins. Co. 
(1942) 343 Pa 505, 23 A2d 430. 
1. Flower v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
(1940, App) 36 Ohio L Abs 381, 44 
NE2d 110. 
2. Sutter v Massachusetts Bonding & Ins 
Co (1919) 215 111 App 341. 
3. Provident Life & Ace Ins. Co. v Dow-
ney (1942) 242 Ala 482, 7 So 2d 17 
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§ 74:703. —Questions of law. ^ 
Although the question of proximate cause ordinarily is fo* iuc jury^ 
such is not the case where the facts are undisputed' or there is but one 
inference possible from the settled facts.* That is to say, the jury should 
not be allowed to speculate, and the question of proximate cause, 
should not be submitted to the jury, where there is no substantial] 
evidence upon which to base a finding that the loss was proximately! 
caused by a risk insured against.7 - ^m 
At the same time, it is only where the evidence is so overwhelmingly 
on one side as to preclude an opportunity for reasonable minds
 ftcr 
differ that the court should direct a verdict.' 
§ 74:704. Sufficiency of evidence. 
Where deceased had a fall, of which he bore the bruise, and of thel 
effects of which he complained several days, when he fell sick and diedj 
the jury has a right to believe, where the evidence is conflicting aS|toj 
the direct cause of death, that the fall produced the death.* H $ 
Causal connection between an accident to the automobile in whichj 
insured was riding and an injury to insured is established where thej 
In action on policy covering damage i 
to plant's steam piping system and loss! 
on property directly damaged by a J 
covered accident, there was sufficient J 
evidence from which jury could have! 
found that damage to turbines was! 
direct result of accident that broke^ 
steam pipes and permitted debris to^ 
enter where superintendent of powerj* 
plant, who had been in charge of re-% 
pairs, testified that before accident tur-|« 
bines had been sealed and that only *i 
explanation for foreign matter inside! 
them was breaking, during accident, of jj 
steam pipes that led into them. Simkins
 a 
Industries, Inc v Lexington Ins. Co.f 
(1979) 42 Md App 396, 401 A2d 181. 1 
Finding that insured under acciden-| 
tal dismemberment policy lost leg asj 
direct result of bodily injuries sustained] 
as result of blow to leg could not be* 
sustained in absence of expert medical j 
testimony establishing a causal relation-J 
ship between blow and subsequent in-i 
fection and amputation of leg. Lanconj 
v Employers Nat. Life Ins. Co (1968,1 
Tex Civ App 1st Dist) 424 SW2d 321, \ 
writ ref n r e. I 
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4. See §§ 74 700 et seq 
5. McBurgess v Federal Life Ins. Co. 
(1927) 5 Tenn App 284 
6. Muller v Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. 
Co (1917, CA2 NY) 246 F 759; West-
ern Assur Co. v Hann (1917) 201 Ala 
376, 78 So 232 
7. Parshall v Mechanics & Traders' Ins 
Co. (1922, Mo App) 245 SW 354 
(holding that there was nothing but 
speculative evidence upon which to 
base a finding that damage to the in-
sured goods from water from a broken 
pipe was caused by fire); Whipple v 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1922) 134 Va 
195, 113 SE 878 (holding that there 
was not sufficient evidence to sustain a 
finding that blindness resulted from an 
accident to, and the extraction of, a 
tooth). 
8. Clay County Cotton Co. v Home Life 
Ins Co (1940, CA8 Ark) 113 F2d 856. 
9. Standard Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v 
Thomas (1891) 13 Ky LR 593, 17 SW 
275 
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d 
[accident consisted in the throwing of a stick against the car and the 
Jiinjury resulted from its deflection and striking of insured.10 
L%- One may recover on an accident policy if his injury results from 
[either of two accidental causes, even though he cannot show which was 
[in fact the cause." 
fi Where a canalboat was insured, with the privilege of carrying lime in 
rels, against fire and other marine perils, and it appeared that due 
[care, was taken in loading the lime in a safe condition, and in 
>rotecting it thereafter; that while in tow the boat was discovered to be 
[on fire, and it was attempted to unload it, but the deck was so hot that 
le unloading could not be continued, and the boat was scuttled; and it 
appeared that the boat was seaworthy; that smoke was seen 
suing from! the hold; that several pieces of heads of barrels were 
turned into charcoal; and that pitch oozed from the seams of the boat, 
Sowing to intense heat on deck, it was held that fire was the proximate 
[cause of the loss." 
? WHAT CONSTITUTES PROXIMATE CAUSE 
|§ 74:705. Generally. 
\The view | is declared by some courts that in determining what 
{constitutes proximate cause in insurance cases the same conditions 
[apply equally in contract and tort actions.18 
j^ There. is authority that with respect to liability for negligence, the 
[concept of proximate cause is applicable to insurance law only where 
ithe question is whether a cause is the sole cause. Thus, it has been said 
[that the rule of proximate cause, as applied in negligence actions, is not 
fgiven full eifect in actions on policies insuring against accident; rather, 
Ithe rule is that the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in 
[determining ^whether or not an injury or death is caused solely by the 
fact or accident against which indemnity is given, while in ordinary 
•negligence cases the proximate cause determines the existence of 
Inability." J ; 
13. New York & Boston Despatch Ex-
press Co. v Traders' & Mechanics* Ins. 
Co. (1882) 132 Mass 377. 
14. Federal Life Ins. Co. v White (1929, 
Tex Civ App) 23 SW2d 832, writ ref. 
As to a statement that the doctrine 
of proximate cause as applied to an 
accident insurance policy is materially 
different from the doctrine as applied in 
cases of ordinary negligence, see Mc-
10, Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v Bareficld 
K1933) 187 Ark 676, 61 SW2d 698, affd 
L291 US 375. 78 L Ed 999, 54 S Ct 486, 
I reh den 292 US 600, 78 L Ed 1464, 54 
I SCt 627. J 
••••i • 
111. Henderson v Travelers Ins. Co. 
, (1928) 262 Mast 522, 160 NE 415. 
fl2. Singleton v Phoenix Ins. Co. (1892) 
I* 132 NY 298, 30 NE 839. 
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There is authority which purports to distinguish between the proxi-i 
mate cause for insurance law purposes and for tort law purposes on the 
ground that foreseeability is not an element of the proximate cause 
concept in insurance.18 J 
And there is authority that proximate cause in contract actions is 
not determined by the same principles applicable in tort action.1* j 
In view of the wide use of limiting clauses in policies speaking in1 
terms of a "sole" cause or similar provisions, it becomes academic to 
pursue the matter beyond recognizing that the contract of insurance' 
may by its express terms "disqualify" a cause which, in the absence of 
such a policy provision or under principles of general tort law, would; 
be deemed a proximate cause.17 Thus, it has been held that the doctrine 
of proximate cause has no application in ascertaining liability upon^  
policies which contain clauses relieving the insurance company from 
liability where death is caused or contributed to directly or indirectly,] 
or wholly or partially, by disease, and the evidence shows that disease 
contributed to the death.1* J 
Liability under a policy indemnifying against liability for bodily! 
injuries arising out of the use of coal trucks should not be extended to 
a result distinctly remote from the use of the truck, although the chain1 
of causation is not broken.18 i 
Under fire and explosion policies on a grain elevator where an 
explosion and fire damage the ventilating machinery with the result 
that the corn deteriorates, it is of no consequence that inherent 
combustible properties of the grain actually caused the deterioration1 
and loss. The principle of proximate cause "applies although within the 
network of causation there may be found the operation of natural 
forces'' to which the contingency insured against has given place.** 
§ 74:706. Causal relation distinguished. 
It is necessary to distinguish between causal relation and the concept 
of proximate cause. Causal relation requires only a cause and effect 
relationship or sequence whereas proximate cause imposes an element' 
1 
Burgess v Federal Life Ins. Co. (1927) 17. Evans v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.] 
5 Tenn App 284. (1946) 26 Wash 2d 594, 174 P2d 961. j 
15. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Ivy I8- Evans v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,i 
(1933) 18 Tenn App 106, 73 SW2d s u P r a - j 
7J&J7f?nrS? LJ£o ^ J£,A£*Uy 19- Schmidt v Utilities Ins. Co. (1944) (1937) 130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d 972. 353
 M o 213, 182 SW2d 181. 
16. Pacific Union Club v Commercial 20. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. vi 
Union Assur. Co. (1910) 12 Cal App Board of Comrs. (1944, CA5 La) 141 F 
503, 107 P 728. 2d 600. I 
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»of nearness or proximateness of the cause to the effect or result. Thus, 
a cause which is remote is not a "proximate cause," even though it is 
in the line of causation.11 
v
 § 74:707, Contributing cause. 
The fact that several causes contribute to the loss removes the 
"necessity of proving the proximate cause of the loss.1 
!
A contributing cause from a scientific standpoint is not necessarily a 
oximately contributing cause from a legal standpoint.* 
^ -
£
 W t 
74:708. Sole cause distinguished. 
The requirement that the peril insured against be the proximate 
use of the lo<*s does not require that it be the sole cause in the 
| absen - of an express policy provision to that effect.8 
:
^ If the cause designated in a hail and extended coverage rider of a fire 
^and lightning policy is the dominant and efficient cause of loss, the 
i right of insured to recover will not be defeated by the fact that there 
^were contributory causes not covered in the policy.4 
Ijf * xf | § 74:709. Train of events test. 
g $ A cause is proximate when it sets in motion a chain of events which 
^result in the loss without the intervention of any new or independent 
Iforce.' %\ 
i j : | i 
[21. Merchants Co. v Hartford Acci & 
llndem. Ca (1939) 187 Miss 301, 188 
ESo 571, sugg of error overr 187 Miss 309, 192 So 566. 
| £ Miller v Mutual Ben L Ins. Co 
; (1871) 31 Iowa 216. 
^ I * |2» Equitable' Life Assur. Soc v Gratiot 
%(l933)4$Wyol , 14 P2d 438 
Under Iowa law, where a party is 
I suffering from a pre-existing disease 
• and an accident occurs thereafter, even 
* though the disease itself may have had 
some contributing remote role in the 
death, nevertheless, such a disease is 
only a condition and not the proximate 
cause of death. Continental Casualty 
Co. v Jackson (1968, CA8 Iowa) 400 
F2d285. 
* Generally, coverage will extend when 
s damage results from more than one 
[cause even though one of the causes is 
specifically excluded Avis v Hartford 
Fire Ins Co (1973) 283 NC 142, 195 
SE2d 545, revg 16 NC App 588, 192 
SE2d 593 
3. Marks v Lumbermen's Ins Co (1946) 
160 Pa Super 66, 49, A2d 855 
4. Evana Plantation, Inc v Yorkshire 
Ins Co. (1952) 214 Miss 321, 58 So 2d 
797 
5. Milwaukee & S P R Co v Kellogg 
(1877) 94 US 469, 24 L Ed 256, quoted 
m Lynn Gas & Electric Co v Menden 
Fire Ins Co. (1893) 158 Mass 570, 33 
NE 690; National Life & Acci Ins Co. 
v McGhee (1939) 238 Ala Ail, 191 So 
884, Berry v United Commercial Trav-
elers (1915) 172 Iowa 429, 154 NW 
598, Tracy v Palmetto Fire Ins Co. 
(1928) 207 Iowa 1042, 222 NW 447; 
Federal Life Ins Co v Raley (1935, 
Tex Civ App) 81 SW2d 220, revd on 
•1018 
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Where the peril specifically insured against sets other causes in 
motion which, in an unbroken sequence and connection between the 
act and the final injury, produce the final result for which the insured 
seeks to recover under his policy, the peril insured against will be 
regarded as the proximate cause of the entire loss, so as to render the 
insurer liable for the entire loss within the limits fixed by the policy.* j | f 
Proximate cause is that which, in a natural sequence, unbroken by 
any new cause, produces the result which would not otherwise have 
occurred 7 It is to be noted that this statement confuses the concept of 
causation with that of proximateness and in effect would appear to 
state that as long as there is an identifiable chain of cause and effect 
other grounds 130 Tex 408, 109 SW2d 
972 See, Kuntz v Spence (1931, Tex 
Civ App) 48 SW2d 413, judgment revd 
on other grounds (Tex Com App) 67 
SW2d 254 
When a peril results in the owner's 
losing control over insured property, 
any subsequent damage to or loss of 
the property is attributable to the peril 
causing the loss of control, and the 
proximate cause of the loss resulting 
from a taking followed by destruction 
is determined by the nature of the 
taking Although the events immedi-
ately preceding the taking may proxi-
mately cause a loss, the events follow-
ing a taking may not. Pan American 
World Airways, Inc v Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co (1974, CA2 NY) 505 F2d 
989 
Where gasoline hose assembly leaked 
causing fire on barge, property damage 
liability policy issued to manufacturer 
of hose assembly covered salvage claim 
agamst barge's owners by owner of 
tugboat for expenses incurred in remov-
ing barge to safety and helping to put 
out fire since penis specifically insured 
against set other causes in motion 
which, in unbroken sequence and con-
nection between act and final loss, pro-
duced results for which recovery was 
sought Goodyear Rubber & Supply 
Inc v Great American Ins. Co (1976, 
CA9 Or) 545 F2d 95 
Under rule that recovery may be 
allowed if insured risk set into opera-
tion chain of causation in which last 
step may have been excepted risk tnere 
was coverage under policy applicable to 
vandalism and malicious mischief for 
loss that occurred when vandals drove 
truck into air conditioner and caused 
blockage of drain that resulted in water | 
backup and damage to insured's mven-^ 
tory, notwithstanding exclusion from* 
policy for loss caused or contributed to 
by water backing up through sewers or 
drains Franklin Packaging Co. v Call-* 
forma Union Ins Co (1979) 171 N" 
Super 188, 408 A2d 448. U 
I A 
6. German Sav & Loan Soc. v Commei 
cial U Assur Co (1910, CA9 Cal) 18 
F 758, Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co. < 
Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 16' 
NE 156, Quails v Farm Bureau Mul 
Ins Co (1971, Iowa) 184 NW2d 710 
Lynn Gas A Electric Co v Meridet 
Fire Ins Co (1893) 158 Mass 570/3^ 
NE 690, Cova v Bankers & Shipper] 
Ins Co (1937, Mo App) 100 SW2d 23: 
Clouse v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins 
Co (1950) 152 Neb 230, 40 NW2d 
820, 15 ALR2d 1008, Druhl v Equit* 
ble Life Assur Soc (1928) 56 ND 517, 
218 NW 220, Gowans v Northwestern 
Pacific Indem Co (1971) 260 Ore 618, 
489 P2d 947 46 ALR2d 398, ren den 
260 Or 624, 491 P2d 1178; Maness v 
Life & Casualty Ins Co (1930) 161 
Tenn 41, 28 SW2d 339, Proffitt v Prov-
idence Washington Ins Co. (1950, Tex 
Civ App) 234 SW2d 894, aflfd 150 Tex 
207, 239 SW2d 379 pi 
7. Delametter v Home Ins. Co. (1938)' 
233 Mo App 645, 126 SW2d 262. | | 
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|thc initiating event is to be deemed the "proximate'* cause. 
I t ^Illustrative of the train of events situation, it has been held that a 
^proximate cause is the cause that naturally and probably leads to the 
result; the' cause that in the existing conditions would be reasonably 
^expected to produce the result; the cause which in natural and 
^continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause 
'produces the result and without which the result would not have 
ipecurred/i; 
•^Similarly it has been held that defining it as "that cause which in 
fnatural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new cause, produces 
fdeath, and without which death would not have occurred" was not 
ferroneous for failure to include the clement of "foreseeableness and 
.anticipation of an injury or the result of such injury."* 
§ 74:710. —Foreseeability. 
In some instances, cases have qualified the train of events concept by 
the requirement, characteristic of tort law, of the element of foreseea-
bility, holding that a cause is not proximate unless the harm sustained 
was a foreseeable consequence thereof.1' 
i 
§ 74:711* Efficient cause. 
* In some cases, the concept of proximate cause is defined in terms of 
the efficient cause or the efficient moving cause. Thus, it has been said 
that the proximate cause of the happening of a contingency insured 
against is the fundamental, efficient moving cause thereof.11 Similarly, it 
has been said that proximate cause is the efficient cause; the one that 
necessarily sets the other causes in motion." 
S, Cramer v John Hancock Mut. Life Freeman v Mercantile Mut. Ace. Ass'n 
Ins. Co. (1940) 18 NJ Misc 367, 13 (1892) 156 Maw 351, 30 NE 1031, 
A2d 651. quoted in Berry v United Commercial 
* „ .
 w Travelers (1915) 172 Iowa 429, 154 
9. Provident Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Ivy
 N W 59g. Maness v Life & Casualty (1933) 18 Tenn App 106, 73 SW2d
 Ins, Co# (1930) 16I Tenn 41, 28 SW2d 
706; Provident life & Acci. Ins. Co. v 339 
Holt (1930, Tex Civ App) 27 SW2d 
556, writdiamwoj. U. Park Saddle Horse Co. v Royal In-
dera. Co. (1927) 81 Mont 99, 261 P 
10. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v Stin- ggo 
too (1940, CA6 Mich) 111 F2d 63, cert _
 n t ^ ^ 
den 311 US 667, 85 L Ed 428, 61 S Ct 12. Port Washington Nat. Bank & Trust 
25; National Life & Acci. Ins. Co. v Co, v Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1937) 253 
McGhee (1939) 238 Ala 471, 191 So App Div 760, 300 NYS 874. 
884; Unkelabee v Homestead Fire Ins. Remote causes of causes are not 
Co. (1945, Mun Ct App Dist Col) 41 relevant to the characterization of an 
A2d 168; Bouchard v Prudential Ins. insurance loss. In the context of an 
,Co (1937) ' Me 238, 194 A 405; action by an airline against its insurers 
1020 
ACTIONS AND REMEDIES § 74:7H 
A direct and proximate cause is the active and efficient cause that 
sets in motion a train of events which bring about a result without the 
intervention of any force, starting and working actively and efficiently 
from a new and independent source.1' , n <* 
In some instances the terms have been coupled to serve as a qualifier 
to speak of the proximate cause as the "predominating efficient one."14 
So it has been held that where there is no order of succession in time 
and there are two or more concurrent causes of law, the predominating 
efficient one must be regarded as proximate regardless of the position 
of the event as to time. The cause which sets the other in motion and 
clothes it with the power to harm at the time of the disaster must rank 
as predominate.15 That is to say, proximate cause is not necessarily the 
last link in the chain of events, but that which is the procuring, 
efficient, and predominant cause, that from which the effect might be 
expected <to follow, without the concurrence of any unforeseen circum-
stances.16 
to recover for losses resulting from the 
hijacking and destruction of an aircraft, 
the causation inquiry stops at the effi-
cient physical cause of the loss, it does 
not trace events back to their meta-
physical beginnings. The words "due to 
or resulting from" as used in the air-
line's insurance policy to exclude cover-
age of losses from certain specified per-
ils limit the inquiry to the facts imme-
diately surrounding the loss. Pan 
American World Airways, Inc. v Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. (1974, CA2 
NY) 505 F2d 989 
In determining whether a loss is 
within an exception in a policy, where 
there is a concurrence of different 
causes, the efficient cause—the one that 
sets others in motion—is the cause to 
which the loss is to be attributed, 
though the other causes may follow it 
an operate more immediately in pro-
ducing the disaster. Sabella v Wisler 
(1963) 59 Cal 2d 21, 27 Cai Rptr 689, 
377 P2d 889; Sauer v General Ins. Co 
(1964, 2d Dist) 225 Cal App 2d 275, 37 
Cal Rptr 303. 
In the determination of whether a 
loss is within an exception in a policy, 
where there is a concurrence of two 
causes, the efficient cause, i.e., the one 
that sets the other in motion, is the 
1 
cause to which the loss is to be attrib-
uted, though the other cause may fol-
low it and operate more immediately in 
producing the disaster. Frontis v Mil-
waukee Ins. Co. (1968) 156 Conn 492, 
242 A2d 749, citing Couch 2d. * £.$ 
In action to recover under all-risks 
policy in which insured contended loss 
had been caused by mud flow and 
insurer chimed it had been caused by 
or aggravated or contributed by surface 
water within meaning of policy exclu-
sion, relevant inquiry was to determine 
which was dominant and efficient cause 
of loss; particularly since proof was 
largely dependent on expert and eyewit-
ness testimony as to how damage oc-
curred, issue had to be determined by 
trier of fact. Molycorp, Inc. v Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co (1980, 1st Dept) 
78 App Div 2d 510, 431 NYS2d 824.JL* 
13. Kokomo Life & Ace. Ins. Co.fv 
Wolford (1929) 90 Ind App 395, 167 
NE 156. , *# 
; S% 
14. Princess Garment Co. v Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co. (1940, CA6 Ohio) 115 
™ 380. y ^ 
15. Princess Garment Co. v Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., supra. 
16. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v Sikes 
(1946) 197 Okla 137, 168 P2d 1016.M 
m 
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f An accident which was the efficient or predominant cause of an 
injury has been held to satisfy the requirement that the injury result 
^directly, independently and exclusively" from an accident.17 It is to be 
fnoted that such a conclusion in effect eliminates the qualifications of 
^'independently" and "exclusively," for such terms would appear to 
exclude.the existence of any contributing cause. 
[§ 74:712. Direct cause. 
m In some instances, the attempt has been made to define proximate 
[cause in terms of directness. The words "direct cause" are synonymous 
rin legal intendment with "proximate cause."1* 
i A cause is deemed the proximate cause if it is shown to have led to 
fthe loss and no intervening act occurs which is more directly responsi-
ble Tor the *^oS.19 
§ 74:713. "But for" cause. 
In denning proximate cause, it has been held that the peril insured 
against must be the sole proximate cause of that loss, so causing and so 
connected with the loss that it could not otherwise have been pro-
duced.1 
'4 
17. Carnelious v Louisiana Industrial Life 
Ins. Co. (1931) 18 La App 739, 138 So 
» 3 . | 
18. Dixie Pine Product* Co. v Maryland 
~ Casualty Co. (1943, CA5 Miss) 133 
F2d 583, cert den 319 US 743. 87 L Ed 
1700, 63 S Q 1033. 
Loss is covered under a casualty 
policy where directly caused by a spe-
cifically covered risk, even though indi-
rectly and incidentally enhanced by 
another peril expressly excluded from 
coverage. Fawcett House, Inc. v Great 
Cent Ins, Co. (1968) 280 Minn 325, 
159 NW2d 268. 
19. United States Mut. Acci. Asso v 
Barry (1889) 131 US 100, 111, 113, 33 
L Ed 60, 64, 65, 9 S a 755. 
In action to recover under policy 
applicable to "direct loss" from wind 
by insured who contended that wind 
had blown open gate,to cattle enclo-
sure, permitting cattle to reach feeder 
and eat amount of food that was fatal 
to them, trial court properly gave m-
1U2 
struction equating direct loss with con-
cept of proximate cause in negligence 
cases as being natural, continuous, and 
unbroken cause without which loss 
wou)d not have occurred, and evidence 
supported jury verdict that death of 
cattle was not direct loss by windstorm 
Grzadzielewski v Walsh County Mut. 
Ins. Co. (1980, ND) 297 NW2d 780. 
20. Dyer v Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins 
Co. (1865) 53 Me 118; Mathews v 
Howard Ins. Co. (1854) 11 NY 9. 
In an action on a group accident 
policy excluding loss caused or contrib-
uted to by, or is the consequence of, or 
is in any way attributable to bodily or 
mental infirmity, or disease of any kind, 
it is error to define proximate cause as 
the moving and efficient cause, without 
which the injury in question would not 
have happened, since Texas law specifi-
cally disapproves of the "but-for" test 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v Kegley (1967, 
CA5 Tex) 389 F2d 348, 28 ALR3d 
400, cert den 390 US 946, 19 L Ed 2d 
1135, 88 S O 1033, 
ACTIONS AND REMEDIES § 74:716 
§ 74:714, Nearest cause. 
Where an efficient cause nearest the loss is a peril expressly insured 
against, the insurer is not to be relieved from responsibility by showing 
that the property was brought within that peril by a cause f not 
mentioned in the contract.1 
The rule is settled in the law of insurance that the cause nearest the 
loss is to be considered, and that distant causes are to be disregarded.* J 
In contrast, however, it is declared that where an earlier cause ts*the 
proximate cause because it has initiated a train of events, it follows that 
any of the later events are themselves not regarded as the "proximate" 
cause even though they may be nearer in time and place to the loss. 
§ 74:715. Time and distance relationship. 
Where it is said that the cause tc be sought is the direct and 
proximate cause, it is not meant that the cause or agency which is 
nearest in point of time or place to the result is necessarily to be 
chosen, since there may be a dominant cause even though concurrent 
or remote in point of time or place.4 
§ 74:716. Consequential loss. 
Some courts have centered attention on the result rather than difthe 
1. Insurance Co v Transportation Co 
(1871) 79 US 194, 20 L Ed 378. 
2. Trade Bank of New York v United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1928) 
132 Misc 371, 229 NYS 93, affd 222 
App Div 736, 225 NYS 915, revd on 
other grounds 249 NY 546, 164 NE 
578 
3. Insurance Co v Boon (1877) 95 US 
117, 24 L Ed 395; Hartford Steam 
Boiler Inspection & Ins Co v Pabst 
Brewing Co (1912, CA7 Wis) 201 F 
617, Clouse v St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins Co (1950) 152 Neb 230, 40 NW2d 
820, 15 ALR2d 1008; Holmes v Em-
plovers* Liability Assur. Corp. (1941) 
70 Ohio App 239, 25 Ohio Ops 25, 36 
Ohio L Abs 201, 43 NE2d 746 motion 
overr; Providence Washington Ins. Co. 
v Cooper (1949, Tex Civ App) 223 
SW2d329, wntrefnrc. 
A mechanical test of proximate cau-
sation has been established for insur-
ance cases, a test that looks only to the 
"causes nearest to the loss " Pan Amer-
ican World Airways, Inc. v Aetna Ca-
sualty & Surety Co. (1974, CA2 NY) 
505F2d989. * « 
Summary judgment was properly 
granted for insurer contending that pol-
icy covering "direct loss by vandalism 
and malicious mischief' but not cover-
ing water damage was inapplicable to 
collapse of insured's roof under accu-
mulated water, notwithstanding conten-
tion by insured that water accumula-
tion had resulted from plugging of 
downspout by cans thrown on roof by 
unknown vandals, since neither throw-
ing of cans nor cans themselves were 
immediate physical cause of roofs col-
lapse and since vandals, who could not 
have expected damage to building 
would result, had not caused "wilful 
and malicious damage*' within policy 
definition of malicious mischief and 
vandalism Frontier Lanes v Canadian 
Indem. Co (1980) 26 Wash App 342, 
613 P2d 166 (disapproved on other 
grounds Graham v Public Employees 
Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Wash 2d 533, 656 
P2d 1077).
 4 ~ 
4. Mandles v Guardian Life Ins. Co. 
(1940, CA10 Colo) 115 F2d 994; Ken-
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cause as by speaking in terms of consequential loss rather than 
proximate cause. And it has been said that loss is sustained within the 
meaning of the term proximate where it is a material and necessary 
consequence of the peril insured against.' 
§ 74:717. Antecedent contributing circumstance. 
jg-.An antecedent contributing circumstance is generally ignored in 
determining "the proximate cause. That is to say, a situation which 
merely sets the stage for the later event is not regarded as being the 
proximate cause merely because it made possible the subsequent loss. 
For example, the explosion of gas, and not the lighting of a match, is 
.the proximate cause of loss, where the explosion is caused by the 
lighting of a match in a room filled with gas.* 
I Likewise, 4h - estruction of a plate-glass window, shattered when 
gas exploded upon its ignition by a lighted match being used to locate 
a gas leak, is by explosion, and not by fire, within an exception in a 
policy insuring the window against loss by fire.7 
I^The fact that a policy does not refer to a loss as "solely" caused by a 
[particular peril is an indication that coverage is intended although 
[another cause contributes to the loss in some way.* On this rationale it 
[has been held that if one clause of an insurance policy insures against 
[death "solely" from accident and another against loss of life from 
accidental injuries and the latter omits the word "solely," recovery may 
.be had where an accidental injury aggravated a diseased condition, 
although such condition contributed to and hastened death.9 
[5 74:718, Antecedent independent circumstance. 
»Closely akin to the antecedent contributing circumstance is the 
[antecedent independent circumstance. They are alike in that neither is 
[regarded as. the proximate cause. They differ in that the independent 
K a e y v Occidental Ins. Co. (1940) 66 Westchester Fire Ins. Co. (1892) 44 111 
ife' Otto App 284, 20 Ohio Ops 95, 32 App 429, affd 151 111 331, 37 NE 873. 
W Ohio L Abe 631,34 NE2d 237. '
 w t j ^ , „ 
* 7. Maryland Casualty Co. v Cherryvale 
13. Peters v Warren Ins. Co. (1840) 39 US Gas, Light & Power Co. (1917) 99 Kan 
I 99, 10 L Ed 371; Fogarty v Fidelity & 563, 162 P 313. 
* \ Casualty Co. (1935) 120 Conn 296, 180 
A 458; Kenney v Occidental Ins. Co. 8. Ridgeley Protective Ass'n v Smith 
(1940) 66 Ohio App 284, 20 Ohio Ops (1932) 42 Ohio App 417, 12 Ohio L 
.95, 32 Ohio L Abs 631, 34 NE2d 237. Abs 132, 182 NE 345. 
£«. Heuer v North Western Nat. Ins. Co. 9. Ridgeley Protective Ass'n v Smith, 
I ; (1893) 144 HI 393, 33 NE 411; Heuer v supra. 
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circumstance is not in any way related to the harm, even though:if 
allowed to operate by itself it could produce harm. Thus it has been 
held that the proximate character of the cause of death is not destroyed 
by the fact that an existing disease ultimately would have resulted in 
death.10 
§ 74:719. Closer event as an intervening cause. 
In point of time there may be a series of events or occurrences 
leading up to the harm or loss sustained. Assuming that the initial 
event would otherwise be the proximate cause, the question then arises 
whether the train of events is broken by a later event which is nearer, 
to the harm. If the conclusion is reached that the later event is the 
"actor" event, the legal conclusion then follows that the earlier event is 
not the proximate cause and that the later event is in fact the 
proximate cause. When the later event thus interrupts the train of 
events it is described as the intervening cause. Thus, it has been stated 
that where a chain of events is set in motion by the peril insured 
against and is broken by a new and independent cause intervening 
between the peril insured against and the injury, but for which the 
injury would not have occurred, the peril insured against is the remnte 
and not the proximate cause of the injury.11 
§ 74:720. —Closer event immaterial. 
When the intervening occurrence is not regarded as breaking the] 
causal chain, it follows that the last cause is not the proximate cause. *jj 
That is to say, the fact that there is a subsequent act or event does not 
necessarily mean that the initiating cause is the proximate cause of the 
harm or loss.1* This in effect is merely giving expression to whatisj 
implicit in every "train of events" situation; namely, that the original! 
event is the proximate cause. Thus it has been recognized that if thej 
secondary cause is set in motion or operation by the primary cause, ori 
if such operation is controlled, directed, or influenced in its action or^  
behavior by the primary cause, then the secondary cause is not an 
m 
10. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v Barron 778, 14 So 2d 634; Federal Life In*. 
(1932) 186 Ark 46, 52 SW2d 733. Co. v Raley (1937) 130 Tex 408, 109. 
11. Fogarty v Fidelity & Casualty Co. * z a *'z' M 
(1935) 120 Conn 296, 180 A 458; Har- n . McCargo v New Orleans Ins. CoJ 
din Bag & Burlap Co. v Fidelity & (1845, La) 10 Rob 202. % 
Guaranty Fire Corp. (1941, La App) 1 %{ 
So 2d 830, adhered to (La App) 5 So 13. Mulier v Globe & Rutgers Fire In*. 
2d 390, revd on other grounds 203 La Co. (1917, CA2 NY) 246 F 759. 
§74:720 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d 
• it" 
independent cause nor a contributing cause operating in parallel, but 
operates in series and is a result of the first cause.14 
t The intervening negligent acts of a third party which are reasonably 
to be anticipated do not break the causal relationship.1* 
Injuries sustained by the plaintiff were proximately caused by the 
negligence of her husband, the insured, under an automobile liability 
policy^ where, apparently not having seen a cow crossing the road, he 
struck her with his automobile. The animal was injured and stunned 
and, upon recovering consciousness, ran into the plaintiff, who had 
returned to the road after going to the farm buildings to tell the owner 
about the injury to the cow. Plaintiff was knocked down and suffered 
i^njuries.** 
$ 74:721* Independent concurrent cause. 
v- It is necessary to distinguish between the problems of proximate 
cause and a train of events, on the one hand, and separate losses 
sustained because of independent causes, on the other. If the insured 
sustains a loss which is partly due to a covered cause and partly to one 
which is not covered and it is possible to allocate to each the amount 
of loss caused thereby, it is apparent that the insurer is only liable for 
that part of the total loss which is shown to have been the result of the 
"covered" cause.17 Conversely, it is held that where two causes join in 
causing an injury, one of which is insured against, the insured is 
covered by the policy.11 
14. Browning v Equitable Life Assur. was proximate cause, loss resulting 
£ Soc. (1983) 94 Utah 570, 80 P2d 348. from it could be segregated from loss 
*' -4« * , caused by wind, where, though insured 
15. Szymanska v Equitable Life Ins. Co. showed that tar paper had blown off 
; (1936) 37 Del 272, 183 A 309. and blocked -roof drain and that wind 
-** » ? « - .. -p— i » J /-. rtnAi\ w»s therefore also proximate cause, it 
1%5TSE H U ^ M f e ( } w a s "disputed that collapse would not 
WU 188, Z8 NW2d 306.
 h a v e occurr^ b u t f o r subsequent accu-
17, Insurance Co. v Transportation Co. mulation of water during heavy rain, 
(1871) 79 US 194, 20 L Ed 378; Lum- a n d wh«re. rain and wind having been 
. mei v National Fire Ins. Co. (1926) 50 established by evidence as concurrent 
SD 502, 210 NW 739 causes, insured made no attempt to 
T ...tLi ««-I~J * * u- u J t determine amount of loss caused solely 
Insured failed to meet his burden of
 b w i n d U n i t e d S t a t c s F i r c I n s ^ v 
; proving that ram, loss from which was Matchoolian (1979, Tex Civ App 14th 
exclusion pleaded by insurer, was not
 D i s t ) 5 8 3 S W 2 d m w r i t r c f n r c 
proximate cause of partial collapse of 
roof from accumulated water during 18. Zimmerman v Continental Life Ins. 
wind and rain storm, or that, if rain Co. (1929) 99 Cal App 723, 279 P 464. 
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be added amounts related to defendant's 
expenditures under the lease for im-
provements, and pre-payment of the 
mortgage note. I find that the fair 
value of the property sold to the defend-
ant on December 30, I960 was, on that 
day, not less than $700,000.00; and that 
defendant knowingly received from Rail-
road, as a rebate or concessionary off-
set against traffic charges, valuable 
consideration from the sale in the 
amount of $221,1:53.00. The United 
States is entitled to recover $663,399.00 
as treble damages from the defendant. 
Order accordingly. 
APPENDIX TO FOOTNOTE 4 
See In re Port Auth. Trans-Hudson 
Corp., 48 Misc.2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925 
(Sup.Ct.1965), 50 Mi.sc.2il 613, 271 
N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup.Ct.), 52 Misc.2d 943, 
277 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup .CD, modified, 
27 App.Div.2d 32, 276 N.Y.S.2d 283 
(1966), modified, 20 N.Y.2d 457, 285 
N.Y.S.2d 24, 231 N.E.2d 734 (1967), 
cert, denied sub nam. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Hudson Rapid Tubes 
Corp., 390 U.S. 1002, SS S.Ct. 1244, 20 
L.Ed.2d 103 motion for leave to file bill 
of complaint denied sub nom. New Jer-
sey v. New York, 390 U.S. 1000, 88 S.Ct. 
1243, 20 L.Ed.2d 102 (1968) (condemna-
tion of unprofitable subway) ; Appleton 
Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 
154 Wis. 121, 142 N.W. 476, 47 L.R.A. 
N.S. 770 (1913) (acquisition of unprofit-
able waterworks) ; In re City of Oroville, 
[1922E] P.U.R. 451, 467-72 (Cal.R.R. 
Comm'n) (acquisition of unprofitable 
gas sys tem); In re City of Washburn, 
[1924D] P.U.R. 368 (Wis.R.R. Comm'n) 
(acquisition of unprofitable water-
works) ; International Ry. v. Niagara 
Parks Comm'n, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 305 
(P.C) , rev'g [1936] 1 D.L.R. 737 (Ont. 
Ct.App.1935) (acquisition of unprofit-
able trolley l ine) ; In re Ottawa & 
Gloucester Road Co., 69 D.L.R. 486, 487 
(Ont.Sup.Ct.), appeals dismissed, 69 
D.L.R. 486, 493 (Ont.Sup.Ct, App.Div. 
1921) (acquisition of unprofitable priv-
ate toll roads). See also Raja Vyricherla 
Narayana Gajapatiraju and The Revenue 
Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam, [1939] 
A.C. 302, 312 (P.C. India) (acquisition 
of unused sp r ing ) : 
The compensation must be determined 
* * * by reference to the price 
which a willing vendor might reason-
ably expect to obtain from a willing 
purchaser. The disinclination of the 
vendor to par t with his land and the 
urgent necessity of the purchaser to 
buy must alike be disregarded. 
Neither must be considered as acting 
under compulsion. This is implied in 
the common saying that the value of 
the land is not to be estimated at its 
value to the purchaser. But this does 
not mean that the fact that some par-
ticular purchaser might desire the land 
more than others is to be disregarded. 
The wish of a particular purchaser, 
though not his compulsion, may always 
be taken into consideration for what 
it is worth. 
See (jeneralUj Comment, Valuing an Un-
profitable Business Taken for Continu-
ing Public Use, 68 Colum.L.Rev. 977 
(1968). 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM, V 
Richard L. WYATT and Marie G. Wyatt, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE CO. OF SEATTLE, Defendant 
and Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
J. A. DANENS AND SON, INC., Third 
Party Defendant and Fourth-Party 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
POPPLER-CARDARELLE, INC., Fourth-
Party Defendant. 
No. 4-69 Civ. 186. 
United States District Court 
D. Minnesota, 
Fourth Division. 
Oct. 7, 1969. 
Action on all-risk homeowners' 
policy. On defendant's motion for sum-
782 304 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
mary judgment, the District Court, 
Neville, J., held that exclusionary clause 
in all-risk homeowners' policy for "loss 
caused by, resulting from, contributed 
to or aggravated by any earth movement, 
including but not limited to earthquake, 
landslide, mud flow, earth sinking, rising 
or shift ing" would not be applicable if 
movement of earth which resulted in 
damage to plaintiffs' home was caused 
by actions of third or fourth-party de-
fendants in excavating contiguous prop-
erty adjacent to plaintiffs' home. 
Motion denied. 
Insurance C=3417.5(l) 
Exclusionary clause in all-risk home-
owners' policy for "loss caused by, re-
sulting from, contributed to or aggravat-
ed by any earth movement, including 
but not limited to earthquake, landslide, 
mud flow, earth sinking, rising or shitt-
ing" would not be applicable if movement 
of earth which resulted in damage to 
plaintiffs' home was caused by actions of 
third or fourth-party defendants in ex-
cavating contiguous property adjacent to 
plaintiffs' home. 
Robins, Davis & Lyons, by James L. 
Fetterly, Minneapolis, Minn , for plain-
tiffs. 
Mordaunt, Walstad, Cousineau & Mc-
Guire, by Harold J. W. Sweet, Minneapo-
lis, Minn., for defendant. 
Meagher, Goer, Markham & Anderson, 
by Wm. Robert Nelson, Minneapolis, 
Minn., for third-party defendant. 
Richards, Montgomery, Cobb & Bass-
ford, by Nathan A. Cobb, Minneapolis, 
Minn., for fourth-party defendant. 
NEVILLE, District Judge. 
This mat ter is before the court on de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment 
asserting that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to the assertions 
made in plaintiff 's complaint. Diverse 
citizenship and appropriate amount in 
controversy are present. 
Plaintiffs, homeowners in Minnesota, 
allege that they purchased from defend-
ant insurance company, a foreign cor-
poration, what is known as an all risk 
homeowners' insurance policy; that 
while said policy was in force plaintiffs' 
home was damaged under circumstances 
within the coverage of the policy; that 
plaintiffs have suffered damage in the 
amount of $30,000. Defendant's answer 
admits the issuance of an insurance poli-
cy to plaintiffs but assorts an exclusion 
contained therein to the effect that the 
Company is not liable: 
" *" * * for loss caused by, resulting 
from, contributed to or aggravated by 
any earth movement, including but not 
limited to earthquake, landslide, mud 
flow, earth sinking, rising or shifting; 
unless loss by fire or explosion ensues, 
and this Company shall then be liable 
only for such ensuing loss r "* *." 
In due course after commencement of 
this action defendant served a third-
party complaint upon J. A. Danens and 
Son, Inc. alleging subrogation rights and 
claiming that damage to plaintiffs' home, 
if anv, was caused by the negligence of 
third-party defendant and/or its agents 
in excavating contiguous property adja-
cent to plaintiffs' home, therein causing 
remo\al of lateial support and the "earth 
movement" which caused plaintiffs' dam-
ages. Following set vice of the third-
parts complaint, J. A. Danens and Son 
served a fourth-party complaint upon 
Poppler-Caidaielle, \m alleging that if 
thei r was fault or negligence or violation 
of an ordinance on the part of anv one, 
such was attr ibutable to fourth-party 
defendant v\ho omplowd thud-par ty de-
fendant to do ( \<a \a t ing wo»k on the 
contiguous pi opei t\ and w ho duected and 
instructed as to the manner and place of 
excavation. Hotli thud-paitv and fourth-
parts defendants have tiled a n s w e r here-
in denying culpability. 
Plaintiffs take the position that the 
exclusionary language above quoted was 
designed and intended to exclude from 
coverage damage irom natural causes and 
natural phenomena; i.e., earthquakes, 
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landslides, mud flow and other similar 
occurrences but that where the proximate 
and efficient cause of damage definitely 
is the action of a third-party, this exclu-
sion does not apply even though the ac-
tions of such third-party may incidental-
ly have caused some "earth movement." 
Plaintiffs assert that the reason for 
the insertion of the exclusionary clause 
above quoted in all risk insurance poli-
cies is to relieve the insurer from oc-
casional major disasters which are almost 
impossible to predict and thus to insure 
against. There are earthquakes or floods 
which cause a major catastrophe and 
wreak damage to everyone in a large 
area rather than one individual policy-
holder. When such happens, the very 
basis upon which insurance companies 
operate is said to be destroyed. When 
damage i& so widespread no longer can 
insurance companies spread the risk and 
offset a few or the average percentage 
of losses by many premiums. Looking 
at the special exclusionary clause in the 
policy here in question, it seems to cover 
situations where one single event could 
adversely affect a large number of poli-
cyholders. Besides the particular clause 
which is before this court the insurer 
also excludes floods, tidal waves, a back 
up of water below the surface, changes 
in temperature and changes in the law. 
All of these are phenomena likely to af-
fect great numbers of people when they 
occur. 
This gives some force to the view that 
the various exclusions were not intended 
to cover the situation as here where 
"earth movement" occurred under a sin-
gle dwelling, allegedly due to human 
action of third persons in the immediate 
vicinity of the damage. It seems hard 
to contend that the insurance policy 
meant to exclude all earth movements, 
for it is difficult to distinguish between 
a situation where a piece of heavy equip-
ment breaks loose and hits a house caus-
ing serious damage and a situation where 
that equipment instead hits only an em-
bankment next to a house but causes the 
earth to move and thereby damages the 
house. Certainly not all earth move-
ments, or at least those where some hu-
man action causes such are included in 
the exclusion. If this interpretation 
creates an ambiguity in the language 
then it is necessary to decide what earth 
movements were intended to be covered. 
The class cited in the exclusionary clause 
is therefore held, if not limited to natural 
phenomena, at least not to exclude cover-
age in the case at bar. 
There is no dispute that the policy 
here involved covers acts of others than 
the owner. Plaintiffs urge that the prox-
imate and efficient cause of this injury 
and damage is the act of the third and/or 
fourth-party defendant; that defendant 
insurer itself so asserts by bringing a 
third-party complaint and thus is estop-
ped to deny the interpretation that plain-
tiff places on the exclusionary clause in 
the policy. The court need not however 
and so does not base its decision hereon 
on the grounds of estoppel. 
Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the cases 
of Sauer v. General Ins. Co. of America, 
225 Cal.App.2ri 275, 37 Cal.Rptr. 303, 
304 (1964); Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 
2d 21, 27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 
(1963); New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Lenoff, 
315 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1963). 
The Saner case involved an exclusion-
ary clause identical to the one in the case 
at bar. There leakage from a pipe caus-
ed a portion of the land beneath a house 
to sink. The court held that the dis-
charge of water from the pipe was the 
efficient proximate cause of the damage 
rather than the settling of the earth. 
It added that the cause to which the 
loss was attributed was the cause which 
sets the earth in motion. Thus it would 
appear that a distinction should be 
drawn between an excluded event which 
is a cause and such an event which is the 
inevitable result of another event. 
The further case of Anderson v. In-
diana Lumbermans Mutual Ins. Co. of 
Indianapolis, Ind., 127 So.2d 304 (La. 
App. 2nd Cir. 1961), involved a loss under 
an insurance policy which had an exclu-
sionary clause for " [damage] caused 
directly or indirectly by earthquakes or 
784 304 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
other earth movements, except land-
slides." There it was claimed that the 
damage was due to other earth move-
ments. The court noted tha t : 
« * # * T,ne position so taken is to 
the effect that plaintiff alleges the 
cause of the loss to be from contraction 
and expansion of the earth, that such 
constitutes earth movement, and. there-
fore, that the loss is excluded from 
coverage by the exclusion clause. We 
cannot so construe the clause. As 
hereinabove stated, the pronouncement 
of the Supreme Court of this state 
* * * requires tha t the language 
of such exemption of coverage must 
be clear and specific. In this instance 
'earth movements' is entirely too 
general to have application to any de-
gree of certainty. Under the 'ejusdem 
generis* doctrine, the words 'earth 
movement* as used in the policy must 
be construed as embracing the same 
general kind, class or nature of peril 
as its companion words 'earthquake' 
and 'landslide'. The alleged circum-
stances, therefore, do not warrant the 
construction of 'earth movement' as 
contended for by the insurer." 127 
So.2d at 308. 
Consistent in theory with the above 
cited cases, though differing in it^ facts, 
is Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Cential 
Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 2G8 
(1968). 
Since the court finds the interpreta-
tion contended for by plainti l is to be 
sound, it is perfectly obvious that there 
exists a fact question for trial by the 
court and jury, namely, was the move-
ment of earth which resulted in damage 
to the house caused by the actions of 
third part ies. If in fact at the trial it 
is established that actions of the third or 
fourth-party defendants or others caused 
such then the policy will be held by the 
court to cover plaintiffs' provable damage 
and the exclusionary clause held not ap-
plicable. Thus the court cannot say 
that there is no material fact issue in-
volved and thus the motion for summary 
judgment must be denied. A separate 
order has been entered to this effect. 
VV. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, 
United States Department of Labor, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PICKETT FOOD SERVICE, INC., 
Defendant. 
Civ. No. 7216. 
United States District Court 
D. New Mexico. 
July 8, 19^8. 
Action by Secretary of Labor to en-
join withholding of minimum and over-
time wages allegedly due under Fair La-
bor Standards Act, and to enforce 
record-keeping provisions of the Act. 
The District Court, Bratton, J., held 
that a corpoiation operating a cafeteria 
under contract to ser \e employees at a 
missile range was not engaged in activi-
ties directly essential to production of 
goods for interstate commerce and was 
exempt as a "retail or s e n ice establish-
ment" despite the contention that the 
cafeteria was not open to the general 
public, where the corporation placed no 
restrictions on whom it would serve. 
Order in accoidance with opinion. 
1. Labor Relations C=niO 
"Directly essential" test of Fair La-
bor Standards Act a n e r a g e and retail 
exemption aie mutually exclusne, and if 
establishment is not covered by "directly 
essential" test, retail exemption is avail-
able to it. Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1088, ^§ 6, 7, 13(a) (2, 2<M as amended 
29 U.S.C.A. ^ 206, 207, 213(a) (2, 20). 
2. Labor Relations C=>1210. 1211 
"Retail or service establishment" 
within Fair Labor Standards Act may 
be characterized as one which sells goods 
or s e m c e s in small quantities to general 
public and which is at very end of 
stream of distribution. Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 193S, §$ G, 7, 13(a) (2, 
20) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. S§ 206, 207, 
213(a) (2, 20). 
S«M> puhlK it ion Wouls ,m<l Thrives 
lor nthri MUIK I.U t instructions and 
<l« U l l l t U i I l s . 
SABELLA v. WISLER Cal. 8 8 9 
Cite as 377 I\2il SM) 
27 Csil.Rptr. 081) 
Luciano A. SABELLA et al., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
J. W. WISLER, Defendant and Appellant; 
National Union Fire Insurance Company, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
S. F. 21146. 
Supremo Court of California. 
Jan. 17, 1003. 
Action by homeowners against their 
insurer under an all physical loss policy, 
and against builder, for damages sustained 
to the home us lesult of subsidence of 
the supportive and nearby earth. The Su-
perior Court, Marin County, Harold J. 
Haley, Judge pro tern., entered judgment 
for homeowners against builder and in fa-
vor of insurer and homeowners appealed 
from portion of judgment denying relief 
against insurer, and builder appealed from 
judgment against him. The Supreme 
Court, White, J. pro tern., held, inter alia, 
that an all physical loss home policy ex-
cluding coverage for damage sustained as 
result of "settling" woidd not cover dam-
age sustained due to house settling into the 
soil thereunder to an uneven elevation to an 
extent that its foundation and walls cracked 
and its floor became unlcvel, if such settling 
was the proximate cause of the loss, but 
loss was covered if proximate cause thereof 
was rupture of a sewer line from the house 
permitting waste water from the house to 
be emptied into loose fill under the house. 
Judgment affirmed as to contractor, re-
versed as to insurer and cause, remanded 
for new trial as to insurer's liability. 
Opinion 23 Cal.Rptr. 277 vacated. 
1. Appeal and Error 0=544(2) 
Findings of trial court may not be 
controverted on a judgment roll appeal. 
2. Negligence C=»55 
Doctrine of caveat emptor had no ap-
plication to home buyers' claim against 
builder predicated solely upon builder's 
377 P 2d—56V2 
negligent construction of the dwelling and 
not upon misrepresentation or implied war-
ranty. 
3. Negligence <§=*55 
Builder of a home was liable to buyers 
for negligence in constructing the dwelling 
upon an improperly compacted lot, e^en 
though he did not build the home specifically 
for buyers but built it generally for sale. 
4. Master and Servant <&»32l 
A builder of a home, as a general con-
tractor, was responsible to buyers of the 
home for defectively laid sewer pipe, even 
though it might have been laid by a subcon-
tractor. 
5. Negligence 0=55 
A contractor may be held liable for 
damages for negligent construction of a 
building even though the damage is to the 
building itself as distinguished from damage 
to other property; Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor 
Car Division, 145 Cal.App.2d 423, 302 P.2d 
655, and Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 
Cal.App.2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 disapproved 
to extent they might be applied to con-
tractors as distinguished from conventional 
manufacturers of goods. 
6. Negligence C=55 
Imposition of liability upon a building 
contractor for negligence in constructing a 
home upon insufficiently compacted soil 
eventually resulting in reduction in value of 
the house by nearly 50% did not presage a 
contractor's liability for any and all 
imaginable defects in construction. 
7. Insurance <3=H46(2) 
Exclusionary language of an all physi-
cal loss policy on a residence would be 
construed in the same manner that an 
ordinary purchaser of insurance, desirous 
of knowing what he was getting for his 
money, would construe such language. 
8. Insurance C=424 
An all physical loss home policy ex-
cluding coverage for damage sustained as 
result of "settling" would not cover dam-
age sustained due to house settling into the 
soil thereunder to an uneven elevation to an 
extent that its foundation and walls cracked 
890 C a L 3 7 7 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and its floor became unlevel, if such settling 
was the proximate cause of the loss, but 
loss was covered if proximate cause thereof 
was rupture of a sewer line from the house 
permitting waste water from the house to 
be emptied into loose fill under the house. 
9. Insurance <£=**24 
A house covered under an all physical 
loss policy for collapse was not covered 
for damage to the house as a result of 
settling where the house remained usable 
and continued to be occupied after the 
settling. 
10. Appeal and Error <§=>99l 
Determination of proximate cause be-
comes a question of law where facts on 
appeal are settled or not in dispute. 
11. Insurance <§=>427 
The language "but for such peril," as 
used in statute providing that if a peril is 
specifically excepted in a policy and there 
is a loss which would not have occurred 
but for such peril, such loss is thereby 
excepted, means the peril which proximately 
caused the loss, and the peril referred to 
in the statute as the "immediate cause of 
the loss" means that which is immediate 
in time to the occurrence of the damage. 
West's Ann.Insurance Code, §§ 530, 532. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Insurance C=»424 
Even if damage to a home covered un-
der an all physical loss policy occurred as 
the result of operation of forces inherent 
in uncompactcd fill under the home and 
defective workmanship in installation of 
a sewer pipe which broke and allowed 
filtration of water into the fill, the loss 
was nevertheless a "risk" properly the sub-
ject of insurance as the breaking of the 
pipe and consequent induction of the water 
could be viewed as an unanticipated ex-
ternal event or casualty rather than an 
inevitable occurrence. West's Ann.Ins. 
Code, § 250. 
See publication Words and I'll ruses 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Carter, Terreo & O'Connell and Loyd \V. 
Carter, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
Bagshaw, Schaal, Martinelli, Weissick 
& Jordan and A. E. Bagshaw, San Rafael, 
for defendant and appellant. 
Thornton & Taylor aud Jerome F. 
Downs, San Francisco, for defendant and 
respondent. 
WHITE, Justice pro tern. 
Defendant J. W. Wisler, the builder of a 
home found to have been negligently con-
structed upon an improperly compacted lot, 
appeals from a judgment in the amount of 
$8,200 in favor of plaintiff-owners Luciano 
and Diane Sabella for extensive damages 
sustained to their home as a result of sub-
sidence of the supportive and nearby earth. 
The Sabellas appeal from that portion of 
the judgment decreeing that defendant Na-
tional Union Fire Insurance Company, 
which had issued an "all physical loss" poli-
cy upon their home excluding coverage for 
loss by "settling, cracking, shrinkage * * 
[unless loss by collapse ensues]", was ex-
empt from liability under the policy because 
plaintiffs' loss was caused by "settling"' 
within the meaning of the above exception 
to the insurance coverage. The judgment 
roll, plus the exhibits presented to the 
trial court, constitutes the record herein. 
[1] It appears from the findings of 
the court below, which may not be con-
troverted on this judgment roll appeal 
(White v. Jones, 136 Ciil.App.2d 567, 569, 
2S8 P.2d 913), that the factual background 
surrounding this litigation is as follows: 
Prior to 1953 or 1954 th< re existed in San 
Anselmo, Marin County, a 'juarry site at 
the base of a rook cliff wherein "a sub-
stantial pit had been excavated." During 
the rainy season this pit accumulated rain 
and surface water and was used by chil-
dren as a swimming and wading pond. The 
pit was also used over the years by indi-
viduals in the neighborhood as a dumping 
place for "tree trimmings and cuttings and 
other similar waste matter." 
In the year prior to February 1954, a 
general contracting firm filled the pit with 
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p.irby dirt and rock outcropping pushed 
ito the hole by carthmoving machinery, 
he accumulation of "tree cuttings and 
ther wa<*tc material" was not removed but 
lcrcly covered over. Nor was the fill ma-
:rial pushed into the pit specifically coin-
acted or consolidated except as the weight 
t the carthmoving machinery did so in the 
rocess of filling. The land was then sub-
tantially level and, since located at the base 
f a substantial rock cliff, did not appear, 
uperficially, to be filled land. 
Defendant Wisler, an experienced home 
dlder and contractor in Marin County, 
itirchased the parcel of land from the gen-
eral contracting firm in February lf>54. 
\lthough he constructed a house thereon, 
iccording to findings of the trial court "at 
10 time, either before beginning construc-
ion of said house or during its construction, 
lid defendant WISLER take any steps 
A'hatsove*** to inform himself of the nature, 
imposition or quality of the earth upon 
ivhich said house was being built." Nor 
did he attempt "to inform himself whether 
the earth beneath the house he was building 
would support the weight of said house." 
The construction of the house was under-
taken without soil inspection "personally 
and through [Wislcr's] agents, servants and 
employees," notwithstanding that the home 
was built "for the purpose and with the in-
tent of offering said house, when completed, 
for sale to the public generally/' The trial 
court further found that "inquiry would 
have readily disclosed that said building 
site was actually, in part, on filled land," 
and that "soil tests, made by competent 
soil engineers, would have disclosed that 
said land was unfit for a building site be-
cause of the lack of compaction." 
It was found that the appearance of the 
land at the time it was purchased by 
Wisler was not such that "reasonably pru-
dent persons" in his position would have 
been "alerted to the existence of fill material 
in the site." But in the course of construc-
tion Wisler "personally and also through 
one of his employees acting within the 
-course and scope of his employment, ex-
cavated physically through and into the 
unstable and unsuitable earth to a depth 
of approximately 18 to 24 inches for the 
purpose of preparing foundation footings 
for said bouse." It was found "that a rea-
sonably prudent person under like or sim-
ilar circumstances and as a result of making 
said excavations for foundation footings 
would have discovered" the insufficient 
compaction of the underlying earth ma-
terial, and "would have caused soil tests 
and investigations to be made before pro-
ceeding with the building." The trial court 
specifically found that Wisler "negligently 
failed to discover or notice the unsuitable 
nature of said ground and failed to cause 
such tests or investigations to be made." 
The house was completed prior to Sep-
tember 1955, and offered for sale to the pub-
lic. It was not in any way built especially 
for the plaintiffs herein. The Sabellas 
moved in to the house in October 1955. No 
questions are instantly presented concern-
ing any representations made to plaintiffs 
during the purchase transactions. 
It appears that there were heavy rains 
during the early winter of 1955-1956, suffi-
cient to cause a large quantity of earth and 
rock to break away from the rock cliff 
which rises immediately out of plaintiffs' 
rear lot area, and slide into their backyard 
and patio. However, apparently no ap-
preciable earth failure or damage to the 
house from subsidence occurred that winter, 
or during the rainy seasons 1956-1957 or 
1957-1958. 
In May 1957 defendant National Union 
Fire Insurance Company issued to the 
Sabellas a fire insurance policy containing 
an " 'All Physical Loss* Building Endorse-
ment." National Union thereby agreed to 
insure the house "against all risks of phys-
ical loss except as hereinafter excluded." 
Under the subdivision "Exclusions," it was 
stated: "This endorsement does not insure 
against loss * * * fey termites or other in-
sects; wear and tear; deterioration; smog; 
smoke from agricultural smudging or in-
dustrial operations; rust; wet or dry rot; 
mould; mechanical breakdown; settling, 
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cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pave-
ments, foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings; 
tmless loss by * * * collapse of budd-
ings ensues. * * V (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court found that although 
"there was no appreciable damage to said 
house until approximately May 1st, 1959," 
sometime between Novmber 1, 1958, and 
February 1, 1959, the sewer pipe from the 
house began to leak at a point near the 
house, causing the sewer outflow from the 
house to infiltrate the unstable earth near 
and below the foundation.1 The court 
found "that the cause of said sewer pipe 
so breaking and leaking was either the 
settling and consolidation of the inade-
quately compacted fill material upon which 
it [the sewer pipe] was placed, or the im-
proper closure of certain joints therein, or 
a combination of both these causes." 
After the sewer had been emptying water 
near the foundation for at least three 
months, the house settled "to uneven eleva-
tions to such an extent that its foundations 
and walls cracked, its floors became no 
longer level and certain of its doors and 
windows could no longer be opened or 
closed. The house sank in many places, 
one part dropping over seven inches. Sub-
sidence at various points in most rooms 
ranged from two to six inches, although 
the dwelling remained inhabitable and did 
not collapse. The court found that but for 
the damage the reasonable market value 
of plaintiffs' home would be $18,200, but 
that its reasonable market value in the dam-
aged condition was only $10,000. 
In regard to the cause of the earth 
failure, the trial court made an express 
finding of fact that the water escaping 
from the break in the sewer line near the 
foundation "infiltrated into said unstable 
earth below said foundation, causinq it 
[the earth] to settle and consolidate with 
rapidity and causing plaintiffs house there-
on to settle to uneven elevations." (Em-
phasis added.) The court also stated, 
I. It would seem that a very considerable 
quantity of water thus flo\\<d into the 
nearby earth. Mr. and Mrs. Sabella 
among its findings concerning the cruise 
of action against defendant National Union, 
"That it is the nature of urcompacted fills 
such as that on which plaintiffs' dwelling 
was constructed to settle, and that the un-
compactcd fill settled as the natural result 
of its own weight, the weight of plaintiffs' 
dwelling thereon and the induction of waste 
water from a broken house lateral sewer." 
In order to be consistent with the finding 
hereinbefore set forth that the induction 
of waste water was the cause of the sub-
sidence of the foundation, the finding next 
above must be interpreted to state that it 
is the nature of uncompactcd fills to settle 
as the result of their own weight and the 
weight of objects thereon such as a dwelling: 
and its appurtenances, but that the abo\e 
factors resulting in potential weakness in 
the supportive earth were triggered to act 
by the induction of the waste water from 
the house, causing rapid earth compaction 
and subsidence. In this connection it inibt 
be noted that the Sabcllas' home suffered no 
appreciable damage until the end oi the 
fourth rainy season, which included the 
landslide-causing rains in the winter of 
1955-l°o6. It would not seem unreasonallc 
to infer thai but for the break in the sewer 
line, the \irtual absence of subsidence dam-
age might have continued for SOUK tir^ e. 
'I he trial court further found that the 
process of earth compaction and resultant 
damage to the house continued from May 
1, 1(>5(> until the date of judgment (October 
10, 1%0) ; that such damage "is reasonably 
certain to continue in the future *"or an 
indefinite period of time" until the earth is 
adequately compacted by natural or artifical 
means, and "th.it the said process and the 
damage accruing therefrom was and is the 
direct and proximate result of the negli-
gence of defendant WISLKR." 
7 he Homeowners' Cause Against 
the Builder 
[2] Appellant Wislcr initially contends 
that the judgment as to his liability should 
lhed in and used the facilities of the 
house, and 1'iey had two joun? chiMren. 
SABELLA v. WISLER Cal. § 9 3 
Cite as 377 P.2d SS9 
be reversed since he was not found to be 
chargeable with misrepresentation or fraud-
ulent concealment, and he is thus protected 
by the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied 
to real property. However, since Wisler's 
liability is predicated solely upon negligence 
in the construction of the dwelling, rather 
than upon alleged misrepresentation or any 
implied warranty, it does not appear that 
the doctrine of caveat emptor has any ap-
plication to the instant action. (See Fer-
guson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342, 345, 268 P. 
342, 58 A.L.R. 1176; 8 Thompson, Real 
Property (1940), § 4599.) 
[3] That defendant Wisler is liable to 
the homeowners herein for his negligence 
in constructing the dwelling upon an im-
properly compacted lot follows from our 
holding in Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857, 
860, 863, 13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345. 
In the Stewart case a subcontractor who 
negligently installed the gunite concrete 
material in a swimming pool, causing water 
to escape which damaged the swimming 
pool itself, the surrounding yard, and the 
house, was held liable for the homeowners' 
damages. We stated in Stewart that wheth-
er in a specific situation a defendant will 
be held liable for negligence causing harm 
to the property of another "is a matter of 
policy and involves the balancing of various 
factors, among which are the extent to 
which the transaction was intended to affect 
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to 
him, the degree of certainty that he suffered 
injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the 
injury suffered, and the policy of prevent-
ing future harm." (55 Cal.2d at 863, 13 
Cal.Rptr. at 524, 362 P.2d at 348.) 
[4] Applying the foregoing principles 
to the instant situation, it appears that while 
this house was not constructed with the 
intention of ownership passing to these 
particular plaintiffs, the Sabellas are mem-
bers of the class of prospective home 
buyers for which Wisler admittedly built 
the dwelling. Thus as a matter of legal 
effect the home may be considered to have 
been intended for the plaintiffs, and Wisler 
owed them a duty of care in construction. 
(See Prosser, Torts (2nd ed. 1955), § 36, 
pp. 166-168.) It is apparent that liarm was 
foreseeable to prospective owners when 
the home was constructed upon the inade-
quately compacted earth in the lot, and it 
is undisputed that the Sabellas' home was 
seriously damaged. Also, there was found 
to be a close connection between the negli-
gent elements of workmanship for which 
defendant contractor must be held re-
sponsible, including the placement of the 
foundation of the house upon loose fill, the 
laying of the sewer pipe upon an insuffi-
ciently firm footing plus the possible im-
proper closure of certain joints in that 
pipe, and the injury suffered. As the gen-
eral contractor Wisler is held responsible 
for the defectively laid plumbing even 
though the work might have been completed 
by a subcontractor. (Dow v. Holly Manu-
facturing Co., 49 Cal.2d 720, 725-728, 321 
P.2d 736.) The trial court expressly found 
that the defective plumbing installation per-
mitted the water infiltration which in turn 
caused the rapid consolidation of the un-
stable earth, leading to the damage to the 
dwelling. Finally, the prevention of future 
negligent construction of buildings upon 
insufficiently supportive material would not 
be furthered by exempting defendant Wisler 
from liability for his negligence. (See 
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 651, 320 
P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358; see also Buist 
v. C. Dudley De Vclbiss Corp., 182 Cal.App. 
2d 325, 329, 6 Cal.Rptr. 259.) 
Defendant Wisler attempts to distinguish 
the instant factual situation from that in 
Stewart v. Cox, supra, 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal. 
Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345, in that damage to 
property other than the swimming pool 
there involved was foreseeable, and he 
argues that the only harm foreseeable here-
in was damage to the house itself. But 
the plaintiffs in the Stewart case recovered 
for damages to the swimming pool as well 
as for the damaged surrounding property. 
(See 55 Cal.2d at 860, 866-867, 13 Cal.Rptr. 
at 521, 526-527, 362 P.2d at 345, 350-351.) 
Also, in Bause v. Anthony Pools, Inc., 205 
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A.C.A. 670, 673-674, 23 Cal.Rptr. 265, the 
plaintiff property owner recovered damages 
from the defendant contractor for the full 
cost of reconstructing a swimming pool that 
was improperly made and not usable, and 
one of the successful theories of recovery 
was that " 'defendant designed and con-
structed [the swimming pool] in a careless 
and negligent manner /" Moreover, we 
indicated in the Stewart case that the lia-
bility of a contractor should be determined 
by the consideration and weighing of the 
various factors bearing upon liability here-
inbefore discussed, rather than by resort 
to special rules or distinctions. (See 55 
Cal.2d at 863, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 524, 362 P.2d 
at 348.) 
[5] A further contention by the con-
tractor is that imposition upon him of lia-
bility for his negligence in construction is 
contrary to the holding in Wyatt v. Cadillac 
Motor Car Division, 145 CaI.App.2d 423, 
426, 302 P.2d 665. In the Wyatt case an au-
tomobile manufacturer was held exempt 
from liability to the purchaser of the au-
tomobile for the negligent placement of an 
obstruction within the motor, causing ruin 
of the engine. It was there stated: " [ D e -
fendant's duty was confined to the exercise 
of reasonable care to see that the car was 
so manufactured and assembled as to be free 
from defects which might be reasonably 
expected to produce bodily injury or dam-
age to other property.'' (FmphaMS added.) 
(145 Cal.App.2d at 426, 30L' P.2d at 667,) 
A result similar to that in Wyatt was 
reached in Fentress v. Van Ftta Motors, 
157 Cal.App.2d Supp. 863, 866, ?>2^ P.2d 
227f where it was additionally held that in 
order for liability to be imposed an acci-
dent must have resulted "invoking some 
violence or collision with external objects." 
However, the Wyatt and Fentress cases 
must be deemed inconsistent with Stewart 
v. Cox, supra, 55 Cal.2d 857, 861-863, 13 
Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345, and hence 
disapproved, to any extent that those cases 
might be applied to contractors as dis-
tinguished from conventional manufac-
turers of goods. As noted above, the 
plaintiffs in Stewart recovered for damages 
to the swimming pool itself, the "manu-
factured" article there involved, and no 
violent accident occurred. (See 55 Cal 2d 
at 860, 866-807, 13 Cal.Rptr. at 5?6-527f 
362 P2d at 350-351; Civ.Code, § 1714; 
see also 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 197, 200, 202-203; 
69 Yale L J . 1099, 1102-1103.) 
[6] Defendant Wisler's final contention 
is that if the judgment against him is 
allowed to stand, builders of structures 
will be liable to the original purchaser and 
to subsequent owners for any and all 
deterioration in the structures attributable 
to negligent workmanship. However, im-
position of liability upon Wisler for his 
negligence resulting in the fundamental 
defect here involved, causing reduction in 
the value of the house by nearly 50 per 
cent, does not necessarily presage a con-
tractor's liability for any and all imaginable 
defects in construction. 
The Homeowners' Action Against 
the Insurer 
The Sabcllas, as appellants, contend that 
the rapid and severe damage which oc-
curred to their home was not the result of 
"settling" within the terms of the exclusion 
in their policy. As hereinbefore set foith, 
the policy excluded coverage for loss by 
termites, wear and tear, and other causes 
such as mould. Following enumeration of 
the latter excluded perils, the following 
clause appeared excepting: "settling, crack-
ing, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements, 
foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings; 
[unless collapse ensues.]" 
[7.8] I»ut it appears that an ordinary 
individual surveying the instant damage 
could properly conclude that the house 
"settled," so that placement of the word 
"settling" in the exclusion clause would 
convey to the ordinary person reading 
the policy exceptions (Prickctt v. Royal 
Ins. Co. Ltd., 56 Cal.2d 234, 238, 14 Cal. 
Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907), the meaning that 
the type of subsidence loss herein was meant 
to be excluded from coverage. It should 
be noted that the understanding as to non-
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coverage here relevant is that of the ordi-
nary purchaser of insurance, desirous of 
knowing what he is getting for his money. 
(Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
43 Cal.2d 420, 424-425, 274 P.2d 633; 
Pacific etc. Co. v. Williamsburgh, 158 Cal. 
367, 375, 111 p. 4.) While somewhat more 
clarity of statement might be desirable 
from the standpoint of the average lay 
purchaser of insurance, it would appear 
that the present exception was sufficiently 
understandable by an ordinary reader. 
[9] Furthermore, defendant National 
Union correctly argues that the insurance 
contract excluded with sufficient clarity all 
loss by settling, whether gradual or rapid, 
unless collapse of the dwelling ensued, and 
since the house remained usable and con-
tinued to be occupied, it cannot be said that 
any "collapse" occurred. Thus the case 
at bar is not a proper one for application 
of the rule advanced by plaintiffs that 
" '[PJrovisos and exceptions must be 
strictly construed against the insurer, who 
is bound to use such language as to make 
the conditions, specifications and provisions 
thereof clear to the ordinary mind, and, in 
case it fails to do so, any ambiguity or 
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor 
of the assured.'" (Prickctt v. Royal Ins. 
Co. Ltd., supra, 56 Cal.2d 234, 237, 14 
Cal.Rptr. 675, 677, 363 P.2d 907, 909.) 
Respondent National Union additionally 
contends that the reasoning in Prickctt v. 
Royal Ins. Co. Ltd., supra, 56 Cal.2d 234, 
14 Cal.Rptr. 675, 363 P.2d 907, indicates 
that the instant policy exclusion should be 
deemed to encompass the damage herein. 
In Prickctt, the policy excluded coverage 
for "normal settling," and we held that 
the sudden drop of up to 12 inches of por-
tions of a house due to improperly com-
pacted fill beneath the house was not 
"normal settling" within the terms of that 
policy (See 56 Cal.2d at 238, 14 Cal.Rptr. at 
677, 363 P.2d at 909.) But since the instant 
policy excludes merely "settling," without 
use of qualifying adjectives such as "nor-
mal" or "usual," the policy herein does 
indicate an intent to exclude any and all 
loss caused by settling, and settling did 
occur herein. 
Plaintiff Sabellas alternatively and cor-
rectly argue, however, that defendant Na-
tional Union is liable because the rupture 
of the sewer line attributable to the negli-
gence of a third party, rather than settling, 
was the efficient proximate cause of the 
loss. The policy excepted loss by settling, 
and the findings of the court below indicate 
that the broken sewer line emptied waste 
water into the loose fill, setting in motion the 
forces tending toward settlement. As stated 
in 6 Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1466, 
"[ I ]n determining whether a loss is within 
an exception in a policy, where there is 
a concurrence of different causes, the effi-
cient cause—the one that sets others in mo-
tion—is the cause to which the loss is to 
be attributed, though the other causes may 
follow it, and operate more immediately 
in producing the disaster." The virtual 
absence of subsidence damage in the prior 
four years of the existence of the house 
here in question clearly indicates that the 
broken pipe was the predominating or mov-
ing efficient cause of the loss. (See 6 
Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1463, p. 5298.) 
[10] While defendant National Union 
contends that the trial court made a finding 
of fact "that the proximate cause of said 
loss was settling," the above finding was 
made as a part of the following conclusion 
of law: "That the cause of loss and dam-
age to plaintiffs' dwelling is excluded by 
the terms of the policy of insurance issued 
by defendant NATIONAL, in that the 
proximate cause of said loss was settling." 
But the latter conclusion by the trial court 
concerning the proximate cause of the loss 
is not binding upon this court on the instant 
judgment roll appeal, since where the facts 
on appeal are settled or not in dispute, 
the determination of proximate cause be-
comes a question of law. (Burdett v. 
Rollcfson Construction Co., 52 Cal.2d 720, 
726, 344 P.2d 307; Stasulat v. Pacific Gas 
and Electric Co., 8 Cal.2d 631, 638, 67 P.2d 
678.) 
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The instant prohlem in proximate causa-
tion is similar in principle to that in Brooks 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal 2d 
305, 163 P.2d 689, wherein recovery was 
allowed on a policy insuring against death 
by accidental means where the insured, 
while suffering from incurable cancer, an 
excluded peril, died in a fire. It was there 
stated: "[Rjecovery may be had even 
though a diseased or infirm condition ap-
pears to actually contribute to cause the 
death if the accident sets in progress the 
chain of events leading directly to death, 
or if it is the prime or moving cause/' (27 
Ca1.2d at 309-310, 163 P.2d at 691.) Sim-
ilarly, in Hanna v. Interstate Business 
Men's Accident Ass'n, 41 Cal.App. 308, 182 
p. 771, recovery was allowed on a policy 
covering death from external or violent 
means, but limiting recovery for hernia 
injuries, where a blow on the chest caused 
a hernia resulting in death. The court held 
that under the established rules governing 
proximate causation as applied to insurance 
cases, ''the hernia must he regarded as the 
result of the accident, and the accident 
itself, and not the resultant hernia, as the 
cau«c of the death." (41 Cal.App. at 310, 
182 p. at 77Z; see Note 108 A.L.R. 6.) 
Also relevant is Noi a*ich Union Fire Ins. 
Soc. v. Board of Commissioners (5 Cir., 
1944), Ml F.2d 000, where corn in storage 
was insured against loss by fire but not 
against loss by deterioration. A fire de-
stroyed the machinery necessary to air the 
corn and so prevent its deterioration, and 
the corn decayed from inherent natural 
causes. It was held that the fire was the 
proximate cause of the loss of the corn, 
even though the excepted peril of deteriora-
tion immediately caused the loss. (141 
F.2d at 602; set Edgeiton & Sons, Inc. v. 
Minneapolis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1955), 
142 Conn. 669, 673-674, 116 A.2d 514 
[policy covers though excluded peril im-
mediately brings about damage, where the 
operation of the excluded peril is caused 
by a peril insured against]; Princess 
Garncnt Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 
(6 Cir., 1940), 115 F.2d 380. 383 [recovery 
allowed where peril insured against causes 
the action of an excepted peril resulting in 
loss].) 
[11] Defendant insurer attempts to es-
tablish its nonliability by re/iance upon 
section 532 of the Insurance Code, which 
states that "If a peril is specially excepted 
in a contract of insurance and there is a 
loss which would not have occurred but 
for such peril, such loss is thereby ex-
cepted even though the immediate cause 
of the loss was a peril which was not 
excepted." The insurer's argument is that 
since in a factual sense the loss herein 
would not have occurred "but for" the 
settling of the underlying earth and house, 
the plaintiffs are thereby exempt from cov-
erage for this loss. But section 532 must 
be read in conjunction with related section 
530 of the Insurance Code (Pacific etc. Co. 
v. Williamsburgh, supra, 158 Cal. 367, 372, 
111 P. 4), and section 530 provides that "An 
insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril 
insured against was the proximate cause, 
although a peril not contemplated by the 
contract may have been a remote cause of 
the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of 
which the peril insured against was only a 
remote cause." Tt is thus apparent that if 
section 532 were construed in the maimer 
contended for by defendant insurer, wiierc 
an excepted peril operated to anv extent in 
the chain of c msation so that the resulting 
harm would not have occurred "but for'' 
the excepted peril's operation, the insurer 
would be exempt even though an insured 
peril was the proximate cause of the loss. 
Such a result would be directly contrary to 
the provision in sertion 530, in accordance 
with the general uile, for liability of the 
insurer where the peril insured agair^t 
proximately results in the loss. (See 6 
Couch, Insurance (1(>30), § 1464.) 
It would app< ar theicforc that the 
specially excepted peril allud< d to in section 
532 as that "but for' which the loss would 
not have occurred, is the peril proximately 
causing the loss (sec Ilerron v. Smith Bros, 
Inc , 116 Cal.App. 518, 521 [1], 2 P2J 
1012), and the peril there referred to as the 
"immediate cause of the loss" is that which 
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is immediate in time to the occurrence of 
the damage. (See Black's Lav Dictionary 
(4th ed. 1951), "Immediate Cause," p 884; 
6 Couch, Insurance (1930), § 1463, pp. 
5298-5299; 28 Cal.Jur.2d, insurance, § 446, 
pp. 160-161.) The latter conclusion as to 
the meaning of Section 532 of the Insur-
ance Code suggests disapproval of language 
to the contrary in Hughes v. Potomac Ins. 
Co., 190 Cal.App.2d 230, 245 [4 | , 18 Oil. 
Rptr. o50, wherein the "but for" provision 
of st" Hon 532 was interpreted to refer to a 
cause without which the loss would not in 
fact have occurred, and without reference 
to companion section 530 of the Insurance 
Code. 
[12] A further contention by respondent 
National Union is that since the insurance 
coverage herein extended to the underhuig 
lot area (see Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 
supra, 109 Cal.App.2d 239, 245-249, 18 Cal. 
Rptr. 650), and since the damage occurred 
as the result of operation of forces inher-
ent in the uncompacted till and the defec-
tive workmanship in the installation of the 
sewer outflow, it was inevitable that the 
damage herein would have occurred to the 
house at some time. It is argued that the 
loss was not fortuitous, and hence not a 
"risk" properly the subject of insurance. 
(See 2 Richards, Insurance (5th cd. 1952), 
p. 710.) However, it is provided in section 
250 of the Insurance Code, as instantly rele-
vant, that "any contingent or unknown 
event" may be insured against, and it was 
recently stated in Snapp v. State Farm hire 
& Cas. Co., 206 A.C.A. 919, 922, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 44, 45 on facts also involving move-
ment of an uncompacted rill, that: 4<[A]fter 
any movement of land has occurred it 
might be said to have been 'inevitable' with 
semantic correctness, but such 'inevitabil-
ity' does not alter the fact that at the time 
the contract of insurance was entered into, 
the event was only a contingency or risk 
that might or might not occur within the 
term of the policy." Moreover, the break-
ing of the sewer pipe and consequent induc-
tion of quantities of waste water into the 
improperly compacted fill may be viewed 
377 P.2d—57 
as an unanticipated external event or cas-
ualty, operating to trigger the greatly ac-
celerated action of possibly inherent vices. 
(Compare with Chute v. North River In-
surance Co. (1927) 172 Minn. 13, 14-15, 214 
N.W. 473, 55 A.L.R. 938.) 
The judgment is affirmed as to defendant-
contractor Wisler and is reversed as to 
defendant National Union, and the cause 
remanded for a new trial as to defendant 
insurer's liability in accordance with the 
views herein expressed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and TRAYNOR, 
SCHAUER, PETERS, and TOBRINER, 
JJ., concur. 
McCOMB, J., not participating. 
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William B. GREENMAN, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
YUBA POWER PRODUCTS, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant; 
The Hayseed, Defendant and Respondent. 
L. A. 26976. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 24, 1902. 
The plaintiff who was injured while us-
ing a power tool which had been given to 
him by his wife who had purchased the tool 
fruin a retailer brought an action against the 
retailer and the manufacturer. The jury 
returned a verdict for the retailer against 
the plaintiff and for the plaintiff against the 
manufacturer. The Superior Court, San 
Diego County, Robert W. Conyers, J., ren-
dered judgment on the verdict. The manu-
facturer and the plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Traynor, J., held that the 
requirement in the Uniform Sales Act that 
VORMELIIER v. Oi^EKSINSKI Mich. 287 
\> to the procedural errors raised, we 
niivl them without substance. We depend 
•w both the statute1 and the court rule2 , 
which are included as footnotes. 
Certainly we perceive no suggestion of a 
iniM'arriage of justice. 
We vote to affirm. 
"earthquake, landslide or other earth move-
ment," the exclusion applied only where 
earth movement was the sole cause of the 
damage and did not apply where it was 
shown that the building was improperly 
constructed. 
Affirmed. 
Danhof, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
40 Mieii.App. 01* 
Howard VORMELKER and Hazel 
Vormelker, Plaintiffs, 
Vernon Z OLEKSINSKI and Helen Olek-
sinski, Defendants-Third-Party 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA, Third-Party De-
fendant-Appellant, 
and 
Leom M. Rhodes and Gerald M. Eniig, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Docket No. 10457. 
.. .:; t-r* A p r i l s of .Michigan, 
Div. 2. 
May 24, 1072. 
Rehearing Denied July 5, 1072. 
Released for Publication July 27, 1072. 
Action by vendors against purchasers' 
insurer to recover as "loss payees" under 
homeowners' policy issued to insurer for 
collapse of building. The Circuit Court, 
St. Clair County, Halford I. Streeter, J., 
entered judgment for the vendors and the 
insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
T. M. Burns, J., held that where homeown-
ers' policy provided for coverage for col-
lapse of building, but excluded loss by 
1. Insurance C=277 
Where proceeds of homeowners' policy 
were payable to the mortgagee or lienhold-
er, there was separate contract between the 
insured and the mortgagee or lienholder 
and in absence of policy provision render-
ing the policy void if the mortgagee makes 
a fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent 
misrepresentation by the lienholder to the 
insured concerning condition of the house 
at time lienholder sold it was not defense 
in lienholder's third-party action on the 
policy. 
2. Insurance 0 2 6 2 , 271,1 
Where, unbeknownst to vendors and 
purchasers, real estate agent had cancelled 
vendors' homeowners' policy and issued 
new policy to purchasers and vendors were 
not aware of the policy's existence, ven-
dors could not be guilty of fraud in its 
procurement and trial court properly ex-
cluded evidence of fraud in vendors' action 
against the purchaser's insurer to recover 
under policy as lienholder-loss payees. 
3. Evidence C=2I3(I) 
Offers to settle between parties to 
lawsuit are not admissible. 
4. Evidence C^I29(I) 
Evidence that insurer had settled claim 
under similar homeowners' policy, which 
involved similar claim of earth movement, 
with owner of property approximately 20 
miles from the subject property was prop-
erly admitted in action on homeowners' 
policy where it was relevant to issue of 
I. M.C.L.A. $ 700.20; M.S.A. § 2S.1000. 2. (H)\i IOO:J, r>20.i. 
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whether damage due to an inadequate 
foundation was covered by the policy. 
5. Witnesses <3=>276 
Vendors, who brought action against 
purchasers' insurer to recover as "loss 
payees" under homeowners' policy, were 
entitled to call as a witness for purpose of 
cross-examination the realtor and agei't 
for vendors in the sale of the house who 
was also the agent of the insurer who sold 
the policy to the purchasers where the 
knowledge realtor-insurance agent had of 
the transaction of sale would be imputed to 
the insurer. M.C.L.A. § 600.2161. 
6. Appeal and Error C=>1050(1) 
Introduction in evidence of pictures of 
damaged home near the subject property, 
pictures of pile drivings near the subject 
property and evidence concerning repairs 
done to the subject property did not, singly 
or collectively, constitute prejudicial error 
in vendors' action against purchasers' in-
surer to recover as 'loss payees" under 
homeowners' policy for damage allegedly 
caused by the improperly constructed foun-
dation. 
7. Parties C^56 
Where vendors, who were Juiiholdcrs 
under contract of homeowners' insnrai- *e 
issued to purchasers, bad cause of net ion 
against the insurer ami insurer we grant-
id separate trial issue of its liability, case 
was properly before the trial court regard-
less of whether the vendors improperly 't-
temptcd to join the insurer in pui chaser^ 
action against vendors to rescind contract 
of sale. 
8. Insurance C=>429.2 
Whether earth movement or inade-
quate foundation was proximate cause of 
damage to insured property was question 
for jvry in action on homeowners' policy. 
::
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9. Insurance C=>424.2 
"Collapse," as used in homeowners' 
policy meant a sinking, bulging, cracking-, 
pulling away of the wall so as to impair its 
function of supporting the superstructure 
and destroying its efficiency as a habita-
tion. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Insurance C=>424.2 
Where homeowners' policy provided 
for coverage for collapse of building, but 
excluded loss by "earthquake, landslide or 
other earth movement," the exclusion ap-
plied only where earth movement was the 
sole cause of the damage and did not apply 
where it was shown that the building was 
improperly constructed. 
Douglas S. Touma, Touma, 'Watson & 
Andrescn, Port Huron, for appellant. 
Harry Riseman, Riscman, Lemke & Pio-
tiowski, 1 )etroit, for Oleksinski. 
f lerald P. Mugan. Port Huron, for Vor-
mclker. 
P.< fore DAN HOP, P. P, and T. M. 
P.l'RNS andO'HARAA \\. 
T. M. P.UO.'S, Judge. 
This cause . 'rises out of damages occur-
r ing to a hous<- owned by defendants-third 
party plain!iff:--nppellccs f lvp- inaf tcr re-
ferred to as plaint i f fs) . The plaintiffs had 
previously sold the house in question to the 
Vormclkcrs wiio sued plaintiffs and ob-
tained a judgment of remission. That de-
cision was appealed to this ('our* and was 
aff irmed. Sc . Vormclker v. OhAsinski, M 
Micb.App. W , 1S<» \ \ W . 2 d U5 iV>7U. 
The complicated fact situation was accu-
rately and logically set forth in that upin-
Appi-'T- hy ;<s>i-jum»'iit pu'su.-mt to C.m-t. 
IWi.'i, -Ml. • *>, $ S-\ s»^  luicndc' in lUOv 
VORME:,KER 
ion and will he- used here to present the 
tactual background. 
"In 1957 the (plaintiffs) < )ieksinskis 
engaged one Russell Secor, a con; ractor 
with extensive experience in home build-
ing in the St. Cla i r -Marysvi lk area nevr 
the ' s i te of the premises here involved. 
Mr Secor did not draw :he plans. 1 hey 
were furnished him by (plaintiffs) who 
obtained them from another source. 
"Mr. Secor, on the basis of his prior 
experience, advised the (plaintiffs) that 
there was 'a series of unstable s t ra ta of 
soils e> tending to 120 feet below the sur-
face' on the proposed site of the home. 
He described the effect of this condition 
a.- causing ' large masses of land | t o | 
t«-iid ;o move at infrequent intervals. ' 
"The (pla int i f fs ; apparently decided to 
build on the site they bad chosen, irre-
spective, of Mr. N v o r ' s war .ung, and u.e 
home wu- completed in 1 *>S7 at a cos.1 of 
some .>27,UOo. Shortly tkci cal ler , the 
lestano-i) disclosed, the properly was 
listed for sale and remained so listed un-
til it was sold to (the Vormclkers) in 
1966. 
" (The Vormclkers) took possession of 
the property and moved in. Short ly 
thereafter evidence (if latent defects ap-
peared. They were of a very serious na-
ture. Ultimately the premises, according 
to the (defendants ' ) claim, became unin-
habitable. As the defects became appar-
ent, (defendants) learned that what ( the 
plaintiffs) had character ized as some 
minor' or ' temporary* repairs having 
been made, were in reality basic major 
repairs necessitated by the shifting of 
the land base under the home. 
"The trial judge found adequate 
grounds for rescission and the money 
judgment asked by (Vormclkers ) . He 
granted separate tr ials as to the two im-
pleaded realtors, and to the insurance 
carrier." 
r. O L E K S I N S K I Mich. 2 8 9 
N.W.IM 1>7 
Subsequent to the trial in the above case, 
and while thai mat ter was on appeal, the 
instant case was heard by the court sitt ing 
wnn a jury . The basis of the suit was 
that defendant was liable for the damage 
done to the house under a policy of insur-
ance which the realtor, Gerald Kmig, as 
part of his insurance business, sold to the 
Vormclkers at the time they purchased 
plaintiffs ' house. The policy named the 
plaintiffs as the lienholders thereby enti-
tling them to the benefits provided for by 
the policy. 
The policy of insurance covered losses 
result ing from the collapse of the building 
or any part of it but excluded losses cov-
ered by ear thquake, landslide or other 
ear th movement. 
Expert witnesses were presented who ap-
parently agreed that a cause of the damage 
to the home was a form of earth move-
ment. However , these witnesses also indi-
cated that the earth movement wouldn't 
have damaged the property if it would 
have had a foundation built on pdes ra ther 
than a spread foundation. 
At the close of the trial, the ju ry re-
turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, 
Oleksinskis, against the defendant De-
fendant 's motions for a judgment //"« ob-
stante veredicto and a new trial were de-
nied. Defendant then brought this appeal 
raising seven issues, which we will discuss 
in the order presented. 
1. W H E T H E R T H E T R I A L 
C O U R T C O M M I T T E D R E V E R S I B L E 
E R R O R IN R E F U S I N G T O A L L O W 
T H E D E P E N D A N T T O P R E S E N T 
E V I D E N C E O E P L A I N T I F F S ' 
F R A U D U L E N T C O N C E A L M E N T O F 
H I D D E N D E F E C T S AS A D E F E N S E 
T O A N A C T I O N O N T H E I N S U R -
A N C E C O N T R A C T ? 
In the Vormelkors ' s u i t l for rescission, 
it was determined that the Oleksinskis had 
fraudulently misrepresented the condition 
I. Vunnolker v. Oleksinski. 32 Micli.App. 408, ISO X.W.LM 13."*> (1971). 
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of the property and the land contract be-
tween those parties was rescinded. In the 
instant case defendant attempted to intro-
duce evidence to prove that the plaintiffs 
had committed fraud. It is defendant's po-
sition that if the Oleksinskis had not com-
mitted traud upon the Vormelkers, the 
Vormelkers would have disclosed the true 
condition of the property to the insurance 
company and the policy would not have 
been issued. Defendant further contends 
that as the situation now stands plaintiffs 
are being allowed to profit from their own 
fraud. 
[1] The policy of insurance provides 
that it shall be void if the insured makes a 
fraudulent misrepresentation: 
"This entire policy shall be void if, 
whether before or after a loss, the in-
sured has wilfully concealed or misrepre-
sented any material fact or circumstance 
concerning this insurance or the subject 
thereof, or the interest of the insured 
therein, or in the case of any fraud or 
false swearing by the insured relating 
thereto." 
However, there is no similar provision 
applying to the mortgagee. Therefore, 
since the proceeds of the poluy were pa\-
able to the mortgagee or, as here, the lien-
holder, there was created a separate con-
tract between the insured and the mortga-
gee who is not subject to most of the de-
fenses available to the insured against the 
mortgagor. Citizens State Bank of Clare 
v. State Mutual Rodded Fire Ins. Co. of 
Michigan, 276 Mich. 62, 67, 267 N.W. 785 
(1936). 
[2] Although we have not been able to 
locate any authority to guide u s it is ap-
parent that there was no intent on the part 
of the plaintiffs to defraud the defendant 
either directly or through the Vormelkers. 
At the time the land contract was execut-
ed, the plaintiffs had a homeowners policy 
on the property. Normally such policies 
are merely transferred to the vendees. 
Here, however, unbeknownst to plaintiffs, 
Mr. Emig, the realtor, as part of his insur-
ance business, cancelled that policy and is-
sued the present one to the Vormelkers. 
Therefore, since plaintiffs were not even 
aware of the policy's existence, they could 
hardly be guilty of fraud in its procure-
ment. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 
judge's ruling excluding evidence of fraud 
was correct. 
2. W H E T H E R T H E LOWER 
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ALLOWING PLAIN-
TIFFS TO INTRODUCE INTO EVI-
DENCE A SETTLEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND A 
THIRD PARTY ON A SIMILAR 
POLICY OF INSURANCE INVOLV-
ING A SIMILAR CLAIM? 
During the trial plaintiffs, on cross-ex-
amination, were allowed to question Mr. 
Richard M. Jay, an insurance adjustor em-
ployed by the defendant, about a settlement 
by defendant with the owner of a home 
some 20 miles from the plaintiffs' home. 
Defendant objected to this testimony on 
the grounds that it was irrelevant, highly 
prejudicial, and in violation of the accepted 
practice that settlements and compromises 
are not to be considered as evid' nee. 
[3.4] It is clear that offers to settle 
between the parties to the lawsuit are nit 
admissible. Luce v. Stott Realty Co., 201 
Mich. ?Z7 167 NAV. 869 (1918). Here, 
however, we are concerned with a settle-
ment between the defendant and a third 
party. There appears to be no good reason 
to exclude such evidence provided, of 
course, it is relevant and material. 
"Evidence of other contractual trans-
actions between the same parties is read-
ily received when relevant to show the 
probable meaning they attached to the 
terms of the contract in litigation. Like-
wise, when the authority of an ag^nt is 
in question, other similar transactions 
carried on b> him in behalf of the al-
leged principal are freely admitted. 
VORMELKER v. 
Cito as 100 X 
"However, when evidence of other 
contracts is offered as evidence on the 
issue of the terms or making of the con-
tract in suit, the courts have shown a 
surprisingly stiff attitude, beguiled per-
haps by the niystical influence of the res 
niter aiios acta phrase or misled by a 
confusion of the requnements of suffi-
ciency and relevancy. When the evi-
dence offered is of other contracts be-
tween the Mime parties, they have IK en 
willing to acknowledge that other similar 
contracts showing a cu-tom, habit or 
continuing course of deal ng between the 
same parties may be received as evidence 
of the terms of the piesent bargain. 
Many courts, however, draw a line here 
and hold that a party's other contracts 
with third persons offered as evidence of 
tue terms of the disputed contract are in-
admissible. 
"This is too inflexible and bars out in-
formation valuable to the trier. Con-
tracts of a parts with thud persons may 
.now the party's customan practice and 
course of dealing and thus be highly pro-
bative as bearing on the terms of his 
present agreement. Even short of such 
extensive acts, when a business man has 
once adopted a particular mode of han-
dling a bargaining topic, such as warran-
ty, discount or the like, in a certain kind 
of transactions it is often easier for him 
to follow the same solution in respect to 
the same feature of a new contract, than 
it is to work out a new one. 
"No strict rules or limits of admissibil-
ity are appropriate. There is no danger 
of unfair prejudice here. Seemingly, the 
courts should admit the evidence of oth-
er contracts in all cases where the testi-
mony as to the terms of the present bar-
gain is conflicting, and where the judge 
in his discretion finds that the probative 
value of the other transactions outweighs 
the risk of waste of time and confusion 
of issues." McCormick, Evidence, § 165, 
pp. 346-348. 
OLEKSINSKI Mich. 2 9 1 
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In the instant case it was not clear just 
what the "collapse clause" contained in the 
insurance contract covered. Plaintiffs 
were arguing that damage due to an inade-
quate foundation was covered. Therefore, 
they presented evidence that defendant had 
settled a claim with another p.-'rty under a 
similar policy for damage caused by an in-
adequate foundation. It is our opinion 
that such evidence was relevant for pur-
poses of interpreting what the "collapse 
clause" meant. We therefore hold that the 
trial court was correct m admitting the ev-
idence. 
3. WHETHER T H E TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFFS TO CALL GERALD 
EMIG AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIM 
AS AN AGENT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT? 
Gerald Emig was the realtor and agent 
for plaintiffs in the sale of the bouse to 
the Vormelkers. However, Emig was also 
the agent of the defendant who sold the in-
surance policy to the Vormelkers. Plain-
tiffs therefore called him as a witness for 
purposes of cross-examination under M.C. 
L.A. § 600.2161; M.S.A. § 27A.2161. 
It is defendant's position that since Emig 
was the agent of both parties, the court 
should not have allowed him to be cross-
examined concerning the sale of the prop-
erty and the disclosures that had been 
made to the Vormelkers. 
[5] It is clear to us that the rule of the 
trial court was correct. The knowledge 
Emig had of the entire transaction of sale, 
i. e.f the condition of the property, what 
had been disclosed to the Vormelkers, ct 
cetera, at the time he, as agent for defend-
ant, sold the insurance policy to the Vor-
melkers is obviously relevant since all of 
that knowledge would be imputed to the 
defendant. Wc therefore find no error in 
allowing plaintiffs to call the witness un-
der the statute for purposes of cross-exam-
ination. 
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4. WHETHER T H E TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY OVERRULING SEVER. 
AL OF DEFENDANT'S OBJEC-
TIONS TO IRRELEVANCY OR .MA-
TERIALITY OF THE EVIDENCE 
OFFERED BY THE PLAINTIFFS? 
[6] Defendant here maintains that on 
numerous occasions, over objection, plain-
tiffs were allowed to delve into areas irrel-
evant to the controversy in issue. It is de-
fendant's position that even though each 
instance, taken individually, might not con-
stitute reversible error, when they are tak-
en as a whole it becomes clear that the 
court was prejudiced against the defend-
ant. 
Defendant first objects to the introduc-
tion of some pictures of a damaged home 
owned by a Mr. Peron near the plaintiffs 
and to the questioning of witness Peron 
concerning the damage. 
Plaintiffs also introduced pictures of 
some pile drivings near Peron's home and 
questioned a Mr. Davis about repairs done 
to plaintiffs' home. Defendant was not al-
lowed to show that the repairs done to 
plaintiffs' home were intended to be only 
temporary although it did call a witness 
who testified that be was a friend of the 
plaintiffs and that they had told him that 
Mr. Davis had wanted to move the home 
rather than repair it and that Davis had 
told plaintiffs that he could not guarantee 
his work. 
While we agree that the evidence com-
plained of was not particularly probative 
of the issues involved, it is our opinion 
that defendant was not prejudiced by its 
admission. Neither the instances taken 
singly nor collectively show any prejudice 
on the part of the court against defendant. 
Defendant was not deprived of a fair tr ial 
5. WHETHER T H E LOWER 
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING T H E DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT WHEN PLAIN-
TIFFS ATTEMPTED TO JOIN DE-
FENDANT AS A THIRD PARTY IN 
A PRIOR LAWSUIT? 
In the original action of Vormelker v. 
Oleksinski, supra, the Oleksinskis attempt-
ed to bring in defendant insurance compa-
ny as a third-party defendant. Defendant 
was, however, granted a separate trial, the 
subject matter of which is presently before 
this Court. Defendant now contends that 
it was improperly joined as a third-party 
defendant in that GCR 1963, 204 and 205 
do not apply to the facts in this case; and, 
therefore, defendant should have been 
granted a summary judgment. 
[7] Without deciding whether or not 
defendant was fmproperly joined, we fail 
to see how defendant was prejudiced there-
by since it was granted a separate trial 
where the question of any liability on its 
part could be litigated. Therefore, any 
question of proper joinder is no longer rel-
evant. 
It is clear that plaintiffs were lienhold-
ers under the contract of insurance and 
therefore had a cause of action against the 
defendant. Therefore, whether or not 
plaintiffs improperly attempted to join the 
defendant in the prior action, the instant 
case was prop< rly before the court. We 
find no merit in this issue. 
6. WHETHER THE LOWER 
COURT ERRED IX DENYING DE-
F E N D A N T S MOTIONS FOR A DI-
RECTED VERDICT AND FOR A 
JUDGMENT N.O.V.? 
The "collapse clause" of the insurance 
policy excluded losses caused by earth 
mo\ement. Defendant contends that all of 
the competent testimom indicated that the 
cause of the damage to plaintiffs' home 
was earth movement and, therefore, a di-
rected verdict or a judgment n. o. v. should 
ha\e been granted. 
[8J Both plaintiffs' and defendant's ex-
perts agreed that an inadequate foundation 
could have been at least one cause of the 
VORMELKER v. 
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damage to plaintiffs' hoiK. Therefore, 
there is a question of what the proximate 
cause of the damage was th<* earth move-
ment or the inadequate foundation. Undei 
these circumstances, the t.ial court was 
correct in refusing to grant either a direct-
ed verdict or a judgment n. o. v. 
7. WHETHFR THE TRI \ L 
COURTS INSTRUCTIONS CON-
CERNING THE DEI IXITION OE 
THE WORD "COLLAPSE" AS IT 
WAS USED IN THE POLICY AND 
I HE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS EX-
PLvINING PROXIM \ T L I AU>E 
WERE ERRONEOUS*' 
In IK case at bar the trial court defined 
the word "collapse" as follows 
"Collapse, as used in this policy, means 
a inking, bulging, cracking, pulling 
awa> of the wall so as to impair its 
function of supporting the superstructure 
and de^tro>ing its efficKnc> as a habita-
tion ' 
Defendant requested a detinition which 
would more or less require the destruction 
of the whole building. Thus, under the 
trial court's instruction, plaintiffs could re-
cover for a "collapse" under the policy 
without having to show that the house was 
a total loss. Defendant contends this is er-
ror. 
There is a conflict of authont> over 
what the definition of a collapse should be: 
"A home did not 'collapse" within the 
meaning of an insurance policy covering 
direct loss from a collapse of the build-
ing or any part thereof, it was held in 
Central Mutual Insurance Co v Royal 
(1959), 269 Ala 372; 113 So 2d 680; 72 
ALR 2d 1283, where there was evidence 
that the walls and the concrete founda-
tion of the insured house had cracked, 
and segments of the wall had sunk or 
dropped, but there was no evidence that 
the house had fallen down or caved in. 
The court, after pointing out that the 
word 'collapse* or the term 'collapse of a 
building' was plain and clear and without 
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ambiguity, and meant that the entire 
building must lose its distinctive charac-
ter as a building, stated that where the 
language of an insurance policy was 
clear and unambiguous it must be con-
strued as it read, and that courts were 
not at liberty to raise doubts where none 
existed or to make a new contract for 
the parties. The court concluded by ex-
pressing the opinion that where some of 
the nails of a house appeared to have 
cracks in them, and in two or more places 
the concrete footing contained cracks, but 
there was no falling in or loss of shape, 
no reduction to a flattened form or rub-
ble of the building or any part thereof, 
there was no collapse of the building 
within the meaning of the policy. 
"However, in Tra\elcrs bire Insur-
ance Co v Whale> (1959, CA 10, Kan) 
272 E2d 288, appl>mg Kansas law, where 
there was no claim that the building or 
any part thereof collapsed in the sense 
that it tumbled down or fell in a heap, 
but the court found that the basement 
walls cracked and broke on the west, 
north, and south walls of the residence, 
that this cracking withdrew the sup-
port necessary for the first floor and 
caused damage to the ceiling, rafters, 
and upper walls of the first floor result-
ing in material damage to the structure, 
that a portion of the residence had fall-
en, impairing the substantial integrity of 
the building to such an extent as to ren-
der it unsuitable for use as a home, and 
that the building was exposed to the in-
clemency of the weather and its contents 
were more easily subject to the elements, 
it was held that there was a recoverable 
loss under a fire policy insuring against 
a collapse of the building or any part 
thereof. The court construed the word 
'collapse' in the context in which it was 
used by the parties in executing the in-
surance contract, and took the view that 
the parties did not intend coverage only 
where there was a complete collapse and 
tumbling down of the foundation wall, 
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so as to cause the superstructure to 
come crashing down in a heap of rub-
ble, but rather that there was a partial 
collapse within the meaning of the pol-
icy if the foundation disintegrated by 
settling, pulling away, or cracking so 
that it would no longer support the 
house. The court also applied the rule 
that where a contract of insurance pre-
pared by the company contained a word 
susceptible of being construed, without 
violence, as having more than one mean-
ing, the meaning most favorable to the 
interests of the insured, and most un-
favorable to the insurer, must be adopt-
ed." 72 A.L.R.2d 1288-1289. 
[9] It is our opinion that the latter ap-
proach is the better view. Jt therefore fol-
lows that we find no error in the trial 
court's instruction. 
[10] Defendant requested the following 
instruction regarding proximate cause : 
"You may, in this case, find that there 
was more than one proximate cause of 
the damage sustained by the Oleksinski 
home. Accordingly, if you find that 
there was a collapse, >ou may find that 
earth movement was the proximate cause 
or one of the proximate causes even 
though it need not be the only cause or 
last cause." 
The trial court instructed the jury, how-
ever, that if they found that earth move-
ment was the sole proximate cause of the 
collapse, they should then return a verdict 
of no cause for action. 
It is defendant's position that earth 
movement could never be the sole cause of 
a collapse and the effect of the trial 
court's instruction is to render the policy 
illusory. 
We disagree. The policy provided for 
coverage for the collapse of the building, 
but excluded loss by "earthquake, landslide 
or other earth movement." 
I. Sot* Vormolker v. Oleksinski, .'»- Mi«*h. 
A pp. 49S, is!) N.W.LM H." (11)71) for 
All of the experts agreed that earth 
movement caused the damage to the house, 
but there was also expert testimony that 
the foundation to the house was inadequate 
and that had the foundation been adequate-
ly constructed, the collapse would not have 
occurred. 
It is our opinion that the exclusions con-
tained in the policy apply only when it can 
be shown that earth movement ct cetera 
was the sole cause of the damage. If it 
can be shown that the building was im-
properly constructed (taking into consider-
ation the type of soil, the geography of the 
area ct cetera) and "but for" the inade-
quate construction the building would not 
have collapsed even with the earth move-
ment, then the damage should come under 
the protection of the policy. One of the 
primary purposes of a policy such as this 
is to protect against faulty workmanship or 
planning. It is, therefore, our opinion that 
the instruction of the trial court ^was cor-
rect. 
Affirmed. Costs to appellees. 
OAXHOF, Judge (dissenting). 
I must dissent because I believe the trial 
court erred in refusing to allow proof on 
the issue of fraud. 
The land contract1 between the Vor-
melkers and the Oleksinskis provided that 
the Vormelkers would "keep the building 
now or hereafter on the premises insured 
against loss and damage in a manner and 
to an amount approved by the seller and to 
deliver the policies as issued to the seller 
with the premiums full) paid." As I view 
the case the Vormelkers became the agents 
of the Oleksinskis for the purpose of pro-
curing insurance. 
[ think it clear that if a principal mis-
represents to his agent and the agent, 
while acting as an agent, passes this misrep-
resentation along, the principal may be 
detailed discussion of judgment of re<n-
sioii of tin* < nntrfu't. 
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guilty of fraud Thus, if the Vormclkers, «• Garnishment <§=>I6 
even though acting innocently, misrcprc- Shareholder, in derivative suit against 
sented a material fact that had been mis-
 0ff l c e r s a n d others claiming damages for 
represented to them by the Oleksinskis, the
 f r a u d a n d o t h e r tortious wrongs, could not 
Oleksinskis could be held to have commit- garnish funds of the corporations for which 
ted a fraud he purported to act and against which he 
I would reverse and remand for a new c l a i m e d n 0 damages. GCR 1963, 738.14-
t m , 738 16, M.C.L.A. § 600.4011(1). 
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In shareholder's derivative suit, plain-
tiff appealed from order of the Oakland 
County Circuit Court, Frederick C. Ziem, 
J, setting aside garnishments before judg-
ment, from order den>ing entry of default 
judgment, and from judgment entered after 
trial on the merits. The Court of Appeals, 
Targonski, J., held, inter aha, that share-
holder, in suit against officers and others 
claiming damages for fraud and other al-
leged tortious wrongs, could not garnish 
funds of the corporations for which he 
purported to act and against which he 
claimed no damages, that default claimed 
by plaintiff for failure of defendants to 
answer was properl> set aside where, at 
time default was filed, no order had been 
entered on two pending motions to dismiss; 
and that allegations of fraud were not 
equivalent to proof 
Affirmed. 
2. Garnishment <3»4 
Where complaint made claims of fraud 
and other tortious conduct but made no 
claim upon any defendant "evidenced by 
contract," funds of defendants could not 
be garnished prior to judgment. GCR 
1963, 738 2(1) , M C.L A. § 600.4011(1); 
Comp Laws 1948, § 628.1. 
3. Garnishment <3=>I93 
Where complaint did not set forth 
requisite facts and allegations to support 
garnishment affidavit stating that suit was 
brought on an express and implied contract 
and there appeared from the allegations in 
the complaint and the affidavit no cause 
for plaintiff to be "justly apprehensive 
of the loss of his claim," garnishments were 
properly set aside. GCR 1963, 738 2(1,3). 
4. Garnishment <§=>!21«/2 
The principal defendant as well as 
the garnisheed defendant has standing to 
attack validity of garnishments issued in 
the cause. GCR 1963, 738 14-738.16. 
5. Garnishment <&=>4 
Where only relief sought against cor-
porate defendants in shareholder's deriva-
tive action was that the corporations be 
dissolved and the proceeds distributed to 
plaintiff, there was no claim against the 
corporate defendants such as would allow 
plaintiff to garnishee their funds, since 
garnishment would have to be dismissed 
even if all of the prayers against such de-
fendants were granted to plaintiff upon a 
trial on the merits. M.C.L.A. § 600.4011; 
GCR 1963, 738.2(1,3). 
